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The Unreasonable Case for a Reasonable 
Compensation Standard in the Public 
Company Context: Why It Is Unreasonable to 
Insist on Reasonableness 
STUART LAZAR† 
According to the American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industry Organization (“AFL­CIO”), the 
average chief executive officer (“CEO”) of a Standard & 
Poor’s (“S&P”) 500­index company received a total 
compensation package of nearly $9.25 million in 2009.1 “At 
the same time, millions of workers lost their jobs, their 
homes and their retirement savings in the worst financial 
crisis since the Great Depression.”2 Specific examples of the 
vast amounts paid to corporate executives include: 
Kerry Killinger, the former CEO of Washington 
Mutual, who was paid $18.1 million in 2006 and $14.4 
million in 2007.3 In 2008, Washington Mutual became the 
biggest bank failure in American history, was purchased by 
JPMorgan Chase, and its shareholders lost all of their 
equity in the company.4 
  
† Stuart Lazar is an Associate Professor of Law at the University at Buffalo 
Law School. The author would like to thank Benjamin S. Barry (J.D. 2011 
University at Buffalo Law School), William G. Sacks (J.D. 2011 University at 
Buffalo Law School), and Danielle E. Smith (J.D. 2011 University at Buffalo 
Law School) for their input and output in bringing this article to completion. 
 
 1. Trends in CEO Pay, AFL­CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/ 
paywatch/pay/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 27, 2011). 
  2. James Parks, Don’t Let the Chamber and Big Biz Gut Worker’s Say on 
CEO Pay, AFL­CIONOWBLOG (Oct. 18, 2010), http://blog.aflcio.org/2010/10/18/ 
dont­let­the­chamber­and­big­biz­gut­workers­say­on­ceo­pay/. 
 3. Jon Talton, Outrage Over CEO Pay is So Last Quarter, SEATTLE TIMES, 
June 21, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/jontalton/2009361920_ 
biztaltoncol21.html. 
 4. Id.; see also Chuck Saletta, The Beauty of Washington Mutual’s Collapse, 
THE MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.fool.com/investing/dividends­
income/2008/09/30/the­beauty­of­washington­mutuals­collapse.aspx. 
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Aubrey McClendon, CEO of Chesapeake Energy, 
whose 2008 compensation was $112.5 million.5 Chesapeake 
Energy’s net income for 2008 was approximately $623 
million, an almost fifty percent decline from the prior year 
and the lowest since 2004.6 In the last quarter of 2007, 
Chesapeake Energy’s stock traded at a price no lower than 
$34.90.7 During the last quarter of 2009, the stock hit a low 
of $9.84.8 
Ken Lewis, the former CEO of Bank of America, 
whose 2008 pay totaled $9 million.9 In that year, Bank of 
America received $45 billion in bailout funds from the 
federal government10 and fired 30,000 employees.11 
But does high executive compensation mean excessive 
or unreasonable compensation? And if so, what is the 
  
 5. Talton, supra, note 3. 
  6. See CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP., ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 
13 OR 15D OF THE SEC. EXCH. ACT OF 1934 FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED 
DECEMBER 31, 2008, at 33 (2009), available at www.sec.gov/edgar/shtml.   
  7. Id. at 31. 
  8. Id. 
 9. Talton, supra note 3. 
 10. See ANDREW M. CUOMO, NO RHYME OR REASON: THE ‘HEADS I WIN, 
TAILS YOU LOSE’ BANK BONUS CULTURE 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2009/july/pdfs/Bonus%20Report%20Final%2
07.30.09.pdf.  In his report, Attorney General (now Governor) Cuomo writes 
that: 
  As one would expect, in describing their compensation programs, 
most banks emphasize the importance of tying pay to performance . . . .  
As [one bank] executive put it, “employees should share in the upside 
when overall performance is strong and they should all share in the 
downside when overall performance is weak.” 
  But despite such claims, one thing is clear from this investigation to 
date: there is no clear rhyme or reason to the way banks compensate 
and reward their employees. 
. . . 
. . . when the banks did well, their employees were paid well. When the 
banks did poorly, their employees were paid well. And when the banks 
did very poorly, they were bailed out by taxpayers and their employees 
were still paid well. Bonuses and overall compensation did not vary 
significantly as profits diminished.  
Id. at 1. 
 11. Talton, supra note 3. 
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solution to curbing the problem of excessive executive pay? 
More specifically, should the Internal Revenue Code12 be 
used as a means for regulating the actions of public 
companies? 
This Article briefly explores these issues. In Part I, this 
Article provides a narrative of the excessive compensation 
debate. Without drawing a conclusion as to whether 
executive compensation is reasonably set or excessive in 
nature, Part I summarizes the history of public outrage 
surrounding executive pay. Part I also provides a short 
discussion of the arguments on each side of the debate. Part 
II of this Article analyzes Section 162(a)(1) of the Code, 
which provides for the deduction for a reasonable allowance 
for compensation. This Part explores the history behind 
Section 162(a)(1) and how the provision has been 
interpreted to apply only to compensation paid by private, 
closely held companies. Part II concludes by determining 
that the deduction for reasonable compensation allowed 
under Section 162(a)(1) is different than a deduction only 
for reasonable compensation and that there is no basis for 
judging the reasonableness of compensation in the public 
company context. Part III discusses prior tax legislation 
enacted in an attempt to control executive pay by setting 
forth objective standards of reasonableness in the public 
company context. In addition, Part III summarizes the 
literature that shows that each attempt to limit executive 
compensation not only failed to achieve its goal, but also 
may have led to executives of public corporations receiving 
larger pay packages. Part IV critiques a recent law review 
piece which argues that, not only should the Code be used 
as an instrument to regulate executive compensation, but 
that the Service should use the vague language of Section 
162(a)(1) to achieve this goal.13 The Article concludes by 
urging Congress to refrain from using the tax laws to 
further regulate behavior in this area.  
  
  12. Unless otherwise provided herein, the term “Code” refers to the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. The term “Section” refers to a section of the 
Code. The term “Service” refers to the Internal Revenue Service. 
  13. See Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, Comment, Taxing Unreasonable Compensation: § 
162(a)(1) and Managerial Power, 119 YALE L.J. 637, 638 (2009) (arguing that a 
more expansive interpretation of Section 162(a)(1) by the Service is necessary 
“to set executive compensation reasonably”). 
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I. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: EXCESSIVE? MAYBE. 
INFLAMMATORY? DEFINITELY.  
The examples of high levels of executive compensation 
cited at the beginning of this Article are not an aberration. 
One need only open a newspaper or read a magazine to see 
how much executives in the United States are being paid. In 
2009, H. Lawrence Culp Jr. had the distinction of being the 
highest paid CEO according to a Forbes magazine survey of 
the 500 largest companies in the United States.14 Culp 
received $954,000 in salary from Danaher Corporation.15 
However, he also realized an additional $140 million from 
the exercise of vested stock options and as a result of the 
vesting of stock awards.16 The next four top­paid chief 
executives that year were Lawrence J. Ellison of Oracle 
Corporation ($130 million),17 Aubrey K. McClendon of 
Chesapeake Energy ($114 million), Ray R. Irani of 
Occidental Petroleum ($103 million), and David C. Nowak 
of Yum! Brands ($76 million).18 
A. A History of Outrage 
While, in today’s contentious political climate, the 
volume of the outraged voices has soared to a higher 
decibel,19 the anger is not new. In the 1930s, a series of   
  14. Scott DeCarlo, What The Boss Makes, FORBES.COM (Apr. 28, 2010), 
http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/27/compensation­chief­executive­salary­
leadership­boss­10­ceo­compensation­intro.html. 
  15. Id. 
  16. Id. 
 17. CEO Compensation, FORBES.COM (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/ 
lists/2010/12/boss­10_Lawrence­J­Ellison_JKEX.html. 
 18. DeCarlo, supra note 14. Interestingly, total CEO compensation for 2009 
decreased by thirty percent when compared to 2008 levels. Id. This was the 
third consecutive decrease in CEO compensation, following declines of eleven 
and fifteen percent in the prior two years. Id. Notwithstanding the decrease in 
compensation earned by these CEOs, between 2006 and 2010 Larry Ellison 
earned total compensation of almost $1 billion ($5 million in salary and $980 
million from value realized on exercised vested stock options). Id. 
  19. See, e.g., Nathan Knutt, Note, Executive Compensation Regulation: 
Corporate America, Heal Thyself, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 494 (2005) (“In recent 
years, executive compensation has received more media attention than ever 
before.” (citing Amy Baldwin, Grasso Resigns Under Pressure: $140M Pay 
Package for Chairman of NYSE Sparked Public Furor, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 18, 
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disclosures began the public outcry about excessive 
executive pay.20 The response to these disclosures, according 
to Professor Wells, 
was enormous, amplified by the fact that the disclosures came in 
the depths of the Great Depression. Executive compensation leapt 
onto the national agenda. In the courts, shareholders sued 
directors, claiming that salaries and bonuses paid at their firms 
were so large as to constitute “waste” of corporate assets. Those 
complaints gained a sympathetic hearing in the United States 
Supreme Court. In Washington, D.C., New Deal reformers made 
disclosure of executive compensation a key part of the new 
Federal Securities Acts [i.e., the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Act of 1934]. Congressmen proposed punitive taxation 
to squelch high executive compensation and passed laws capping 
salaries at corporations receiving federal contracts or aid.21 
During the 1940s, executive compensation at public 
corporations declined.22 From the early 1950s through the 
  
2003, http://www.boston.com/business/markets/articles/2003/09/18/grasso_resig 
ns_under_pressure (discussing the resignation of NYSE Chairman Dick Grasso 
after his compensation package was disclosed))); Patrick McGeehan,  Again, 
Money Follows the Pinstripes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, § 3, at 1 (discussing 
executive compensation packages in the wake of corporate scandals). 
  20. Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”: The Fight 
Over Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 690 
(2010) (“It was during the 1930s that the question of how much corporate 
executives ought to be paid and whether some were paid too much first became 
a national issue.”). Because there was no standardized system of reporting, 
exactly how much corporate executives were earning is unclear. Id. at 702. 
However, Professor Wells notes that: 
[A] study of one hundred large industrial firms found the median 
compensation earned by a president in 1929 was $69,728, equivalent in 
2009 dollars to $880,648.  The study also revealed sharp variations. 
Presidents’ compensation ranged from $10,000 a year to $1,635,753. 
Though thirty presidents received compensation above $100,000, the 
million­dollar pay package was an outlier. The next highest­paid 
president received $605,613, and only four of the hundred received 
compensation above $300,000.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
  21. Id. at 690­91; see Grace’s Large Pay Stirs Bonus Debate, N.Y. TIMES, July 
27, 1930, § 2, at 9 (noting the public outrage that occurred in 1929 when 
Bethlehem Steel paid its president a bonus of more than $1.6 million). See also 
infra notes 69­74 and accompanying text. 
  22. Wells, supra note 20, at 758­59 (citing Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, 
Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long­Term Perspective, 1936–2005, 
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mid­1970s, executive compensation grew at a rate of 0.8% a 
year—more closely tracing the rate of growth in the average 
worker’s income.23 The controversy over executive pay faded 
from the public radar until the 1980s.24  
During the 1980s and 1990s, the compensation paid to 
CEOs of large, publicly traded corporations again began to 
rise dramatically.25 In 1980, the average CEO to worker pay 
ratio was forty­two to one (i.e., the average CEO earned 
forty­two times the amount made by the average worker).26 
By 1990, the ratio had increased to 107 to one.27 In 2000, the 
disparity hit an all­time high with the average CEO earning 
525 times the amount earned by the average worker.28 By 
2009, the ratio had fallen to 263 to one.29 
  
at 7 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2007­35, 2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200735/200735pap.pdf). 
  23. Id. at 759 (citing Frydman & Saks, supra note 22, at 7). 
  24. Id. at 761 (“Only in the 1980s did many executives start to receive annual 
pay packages above $1 million, a development that sparked outcries reminiscent 
of the 1930s and marks the beginning of the modern campaigns against 
excessive compensation.” (citations omitted)); see also Meredith R. Conway, 
Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive Compensation, 17 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 384 (2008) (“In the 1980s and 1990s, the public 
began to protest the large compensation packages executives were receiving.” 
(citations omitted)); Susan J. Stabile, Essay, Is There a Role for Tax Law in 
Policing Executive Compensation?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 81 (1998) (“The 
public often complains that executives of public corporations in the United 
States are overpaid.”); Charles Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate 
Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1869 (1992) (reviewing 
GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991)) (“Recent expressions of concern 
from both politicians and representatives of the investing public, however, 
indicate that executive compensation may now have reached such levels of 
outrageousness that some form of legal reaction is likely to occur.”). 
  25. See Frydman & Saks, supra note 22, at 1. 
  26. Trends in CEO Pay, supra note 1. 
  27. Id. 
  28. Id.; see also Michael B. Dorff, The Group Dynamics Theory of Executive 
Compensation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2025, 2027 (2007) (“[W]hile in the early 
1980s public company CEOs earned an average of forty­two times what factory 
workers earned, now they earn some four hundred times as much as factory 
workers do.”). 
  29. See Trends in CEO Pay, supra note 1; see also Executive Pay Watch, No. 
06­16, BRIEFING BULL. (N.Y. State United Teachers Research & Educ. Servs., 
Latham, N.Y.), May 2006, available at http://nysut.org/research/bulletins/ 
20060525paywatch.html (“Not only is this compensation high, but there is an 
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The protest continues today.30 For example, in 2002, 
William J. McDonough, then­President and CEO of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Chairman of the 
Bassel Committee on Banking Supervision, stated that 
there is “nothing in economic theory to justify the levels of 
executive compensation that are widely prevalent today.”31 
In 2006, Former Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. wrote, “[t]hese huge 
paydays, I believe, undermine corporate governance and 
send a signal that boards are willing to spend shareholders’ 
money lavishly . . . .”32 In 2010, Professor Kenneth Davis, a 
professor of Law and Ethics at Fordham University 
Graduate School of Business, proclaimed that “[e]xecutive 
compensation has come to mean corporate greed. Too many 
managers appointed to protect the interests of shareholders 
are looting their companies.”33 
  
increasing gap between the compensation of CEOs and that of the workers. 
According to a study reported in the New York Times of April 9, 2006 half of 
Executives in 1990 earned 55 times the average workers pay compared to 104 
times the average workers pay in 2004. In 2004 the top 10 percent of Executives 
earned at least 350 times the pay of the average worker which is up from 122 
times in 1990 and 74 times in 1950.”). 
  30. See Knutt, supra note 19, at 493­94; see also Bengt Holmstrom, Pay 
Without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment, 30 J. 
CORP. L. 703, 706 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY 
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
(2004)) (“Exhorbitant levels of executive pay have upset the public and the 
politicians.”); Michael S. Weisbach, Optimal Executive Compensation versus 
Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried’s Pay Without 
Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, 45 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE, 419, 419 (2007) (book review) (“Over the last few years, corporate 
governance has become a popular topic in both the business and academic press. 
The large number of high­publicity scandals, the seemingly enormous salaries 
paid to executives, and the celebrity status of CEOs has created unprecedented 
public interest in corporate governance.”). 
  31. William J. McDonough, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve 
Bank of N.Y., Remarks at the William Taylor Memorial Lecture: Issues of 
Corporate Governance (Sept. 29, 2002). 
  32. Arthur Levitt, Jr., Corporate Culture and the Problem of Executive 
Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 749, 749 (2005). 
  33. Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock—Salary and Options Too: The Looting of 
Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 419 (2010). The public outrage has, not 
surprisingly, spilled over to the legislators that such public elects. Professor 
Davis notes that “[a]n enraged Charles Grassley, the ranking Republican of the 
Senate Finance Committee, declared that AIG employees who took taxpayer 
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B. Is Compensation Excessive? 
Despite the large amount written about excessive 
compensation, there is a vigorous debate regarding whether 
such pay packages are truly excessive. According to 
Professor Lowenstein,  
Executive compensation is like global warming; true believers and 
doubters are sharply arrayed against one another debating 
whether there is a problem and, if so, what are its causes and 
cures. Some observers believe that the compensation paid to 
America’s top executives is clearly excessive, while others doubt 
that a problem exists.34 
The group that believes that executive compensation is 
excessive can be divided into two separate factions.35  The 
first group focuses on executive compensation “as a problem 
that both reflects and exacerbates poor corporate 
governance,” while the second group “focuses on executive 
compensation as a source of increasing economic, political, 
and social inequality.”36 This Article focuses only on the first 
concern, leaving the economic, political, and social policy 
discussions for others to debate.37 
  
money should ‘follow the Japanese model and come before the American people 
and take that deep bow and say I’m sorry, and then either do one of two 
things—resign, or go commit suicide.’” Id. at 421 (citations omitted). 
  34. Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (footnotes omitted). However, Professor 
Loewenstein concludes that those who believe executive compensation is 
excessive are more numerous. Id. at 2 n.2. 
 35. See Brett H. McDonnell, Two Goals for Executive Compensation Reform, 
52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 585, 586 (2007) (“[T]here are at least two very different 
types of concerns that lead to two very dissimilar goals for proposals to reform 
executive compensation.”). 
  36. Id. (citations omitted). 
 37. For an example of commentators focused on these policy concerns, see 
RUSSELL S. WHELTON, EFFECTS OF EXCESSIVE CEO PAY ON U.S. SOCIETY 15 
(2006), available at www.svsu.edu/emplibrary/Whelton%article.pdf (“Excessive 
pay, defined as compensation that is 20% or greater than the national average 
CEO salary, has changed the relationship between CEOs and stakeholders. 
While the free market society can present valid reasons for the escalation in 
wages, the overwhelming majority of data concludes that the impact on society 
is detrimental.”). Similarly, Professor Linda Barris notes that: 
While the cost­per­share to the corporation for a multi­million dollar 
compensation package is small, the cost to the firm in terms of human 
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Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried authored 
the seminal work reflecting the first of these factions, 
arguing that executive compensation is inefficient and 
excessive.38 Their “managerial power” theory states that 
compensation paid to corporate executives has often 
“deviated from arm’s­length contracting because directors 
have been influenced by management, sympathetic to 
executives, insufficiently motivated to bargain over 
  
capital is far greater. Those same pay packages which provide 
executives with incentives create disincentives for employees. 
Executive compensation strikes at key economic issues: employee 
morale and productivity. 
Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to 
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 69­70 (1992). In discussing reasons 
for regulating executive compensation, Professor Barris concludes that “[t]he 
theory . . . is simple: Public policy does not support extreme distortions in 
income distribution, and taxpayers should not have to subsidize high­level 
executives through business tax deductions.” Id. at 79. 
 38. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); see GRAEF 
CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS 42­50 (1991) (describing how a CEO will hire a 
compensation consultant to raise arguments persuasive to a compensation 
committee made up of outside directors, themselves frequently CEOs of other 
companies, who are “not very adept at statistics and corporate finance,” but who 
are friends with the CEO and themselves concerned about their own salaries);   
Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate 
Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 37­39 (1993) (applying the law of small group 
dynamics to the relationship between the board of directors and the chief 
executive officer); Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh’s Heart: Harnessing 
Altruistic Theory and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive 
Salaries, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 811, 825­26 (2003) (showing that there is no evidence 
to support a link between executive ability and compensation); Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1489­93 
(1989) (CEO compensation practices do not align interests of managers and 
shareholders); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Policy Case for Denying 
Deductibility to Excessive Executive Compensation: Disguised Dividends, 
Reasonable Compensation, and the Protection of the Corporate Income Tax Base, 
58 TAX NOTES 1123, 1125 (1993) (“The contemporary critique of managerial 
remuneration suggests that, in determining arm’s length salaries for corporate 
executives, the salaries paid to [other CEOs] are not acceptable comparables, 
since those salaries are also set in a closed system by self­dealing managers and 
are thus inflated beyond competitive levels.”). But see Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, 
CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder 
Expropriation?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 123­26, 144 (2000) (concluding 
that the preponderance of evidence points toward increased alignment of the 
interests of shareholders and managers). 
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compensation, or simply ineffectual in overseeing 
compensation.”39 This leads to a board and management 
that set compensation in a manner inconsistent with 
shareholder preferences.40 This managerial power arises 
because boards of directors at public companies are 
beholden to corporations’ top executives, in large part, 
because corporate management controls the director 
nomination process.41 In other words, corporate 
compensation committees do little to protect the corporation 
in its pay negotiations with the CEO, which leads to levels 
of executive pay not based on a market dynamic.42 The only 
constraint on this process is outrage—either from 
shareholders or the general public—which only works in 
extreme cases of executive overcompensation.43 
  
 39. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 38, at 4. 
 40. Id. at 61­62. 
 41. Id. at 25­27. 
 42. See Lawton W. Hawkins, Compensation Representatives: A Prudent 
Solution to Excessive CEO Pay, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 449, 453­54 (2007). 
 43. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 38, at 64­70. A number of commentators 
have criticized the analysis of Professors Bebchuk and Fried. See, for example, 
John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without 
Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & 
JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFILLED PROMISE OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)), where the authors note that: 
While we agree with some of the analysis offered in Pay Without 
Performance, we think it is important to put its arguments into 
perspective. In a nutshell, the key issue is whether the problems 
Bebchuk and Fried discuss are examples of a few bad apples or are 
evidence that the whole barrel is rotten. The essence of their claim 
that the entire barrel is bad rests on the following assumption: If 
contracts are optimal, they do not reflect managerial power, and if 
contracts reflect managerial power, they are suboptimal. The authors 
view evidence of managerial power as evidence that the system is 
failing and that reform is needed. 
We agree that it is useful to consider the effect of managerial power 
on compensation, but disagree with their interpretation of the 
consequences of such power. It is true that contract structures reflect 
CEO power, and that CEOs with more power get more pay, but this 
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that CEO pay is not 
optimized for shareholders, nor does it imply that CEO pay needs 
reform.  
More generally, our Review points out that Bebchuk and Fried have 
missed some important aspects of executive pay and incentives. As a 
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The other side of the debate—those who believe that 
executive compensation is reasonable—generally argue that 
market competition sets the prices for such pay.44 Professor 
Nicholas Wolfson notes that “there is an active market for 
  
result, they have not shown that there are systematic failures with 
U.S. CEO compensation, and therefore have not shown that reform is 
needed.  
Id. at 1143­44 (footnotes omitted). See also Holmstrom, supra note 30, at 704 
(“[I]t is a big leap from the criticism of executive pay to the authors’ main 
conclusion that there is a need for wholesale reform of corporate governance.”). 
 44. See Robert Thomas, Is Corporate Executive Compensation Excessive?, in 
THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA 276, 278 (M. Bruce Johnson ed., 1978) 
(“Competition among corporations . . . sets the level of executive 
compensation.”); Joseph E. Bachelder, Comments on Pay Without Performance, 
30 J. CORP. L. 777, 778­83 (2005); Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion 
and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 542­43 
(1984) (“[C]ompetition over the course of years and decades induces managers to 
act in the interests of investors.”); Core et al., supra note 43, at 1144 (expressing 
doubt that Bebchuk and Fried have shown there are systematic failures in U.S. 
executive compensation); Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who 
Should Set CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., 
May­June 1992, at 28, 30­32; Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every 
Nickel They Get, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.­Apr. 1986, at 125, 125­26; Frydman & 
Saks, supra note 22, at 3­4 (noting different theories put forward to explain the 
rise in executive compensation); cf. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, 
Performance Pay and Top­Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 227 
(1990) (offering hypothesis that political forces implicitly regulate executive 
compensation). Professor Kevin Murphy concludes:  
The BFW [Bebchuk, Fried, and Professor David Walker from Boston 
University] analysis is comprehensive and provocative, and their 
evidence that pay practices reflect more than optimal contracting 
concerns is compelling. Equally compelling is their evidence that most 
pay decisions are not made by truly independent boards in legitimate 
arm's length transactions. Ultimately, though, their managerial power 
view is both problematic as a theoretical matter, and too simplistic to 
explain executive pay practices. Moreover, their hypothesis is largely 
inconsistent with the most important development in executive 
compensation practices: the recent escalation in option­based 
compensation for both top­level and lower­level executives. Overall, 
their prescription to focus on rent extraction in examining “the 
regulation and practice of corporate governance” is potentially 
misguided and diverts attention from more important issues regarding 
executive compensation. 
Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power 
Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 850 (2002). 
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corporate executives” and that excess wages “are eliminated 
by the active competition for [these] positions.”45 
One reason for the high levels of executive pay is the 
demand for “top executive talent.”46 Professor Bengt 
Holmstrom notes that “in the second half of the 1990s, 
executives had lucrative opportunities outside their 
traditional jobs—as investors or partners in red­hot venture 
and buy­out markets, for instance, or as entrepreneurs.”47 
However, the increase in executive pay cannot be attributed 
solely to demand. Rather, Professor Holmstrom concludes 
that a large portion of such increase stems from the overall 
rise in shareholder value—which led, through the increased 
use of stock options for corporate executives, to large 
increases in executive compensation.48 
Professor Stephen Bainbridge notes that the ideas 
presented by Bebchuck and Fried are neither new, 
complete, nor relevant.49 With respect to the originality of 
the arguments contained in Pay Without Performance, 
Professor Bainbridge notes that similar ideas about the 
separation of corporate ownership and control can be traced 
  
 45. Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959, 
977 (1980). Wolfson concludes by stating “both empirical evidence and 
responsible economic theory indicate that shirking in the form of ‘excessive’ 
compensation is controlled by market forces.” Id. at 978. 
 46. Holmstrom, supra note 30, at 706 (citations omitted). 
 47. Id. at 706­07. 
 48. Id. at 707. Ironically, it was Congress’ attempt to reform executive pay 
through the enactment of Section 162(m) that has led to the increased use of 
equity compensation. See infra text accompanying note 189. 
 49. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 1615, 1626­43 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY 
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION (2004)). While this statement appears to reflect a high degree of 
skepticism of Bebchuk and Fried’s research, Professor Bainbridge concludes his 
review of their work by stating that: 
Bebchuk and Fried are to be praised for having written a book that 
makes highly technical doctrinal and economic analysis accessible to 
the educated lay reader, while not dumbing down some very 
sophisticated analysis. They have laid out a provocative argument and, 
in many respects, offered considerable supporting evidence. 
Unquestionably, they have made a valuable and provocative 
contribution to the literature. 
Id. at 1662. 
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back to Berle and Means in the 1930s, and to Alfred 
Marshall and William W. Cook in the 1890s.50 Even the idea 
that corporate managers control their own pay was 
discussed more than a decade before Bebchuk and Fried 
published Pay Without Performance.51 
In discussing the completeness of their claims, Professor 
Bainbridge states “Bebchuk and Fried cannot exclude 
competing explanations for much of the evidence on which 
they rely.”52 In other words, Bebchuk and Fried’s 
interpretation of the data is “often plausible but 
contestable.”53 Other commentators also note that the 
managerial power model can exist side by side with optimal 
contracting theories.54 Thus, even where managerial power 
exists, “observed contracts anticipate and try to minimize 
the costs of this power, and therefore may be written 
optimally.”55 
  
 50. Id. at 1626­27 (citing HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN 
LAW: 1836­1937, at 16, 357 (1991)); see also ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER 
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 68­118 (1932). 
 51. Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1627 (citing Charles M. Elson, Director 
Compensation and the Management­Captured Board—The History of a 
Symptom and a Cure, 83 S.M.U. L. REV. 127, 127­128 (1996)). Professor Elson 
stated that: 
The most significant problem facing corporate America today is the 
management­dominated, passive board of directors. A common 
occurrence in many of our largest corporations is that passive boards 
are responsible for excessive executive compensation and, more 
importantly, poor corporate performance. The board, created to monitor 
management in order to ensure effective decision­making, has evolved 
into a body that, in its most extreme form, simply “rubber stamps” 
executive prerogative. Management, no longer checked, freely engages 
in conduct that is slothful, ill­directed, or self­dealing—all to the 
corporation’s detriment. 
Elson, supra, at 127­28. 
 52. Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1628. 
 53. Id. at 1629. 
 54. E.g., Core et al., supra note 43, at 1159­60. 
 55. Id. at 1160. In discussing significant research done by other scholars in 
this area, Professor Bainbridge notes that: 
These examples are not intended as a comprehensive rebuttal of the 
managerial power model, but rather to highlight the possibility that 
many executive compensation practices are at least as consistent with 
an arm’s­length­bargaining model as the managerial power model. 
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Finally, Professor Bainbridge argues that Bebchuk and 
Fried’s theory may be less relevant than they claim since 
there is “relatively little evidence that CEOs are motivated 
by pay . . . .”56 If this claim is correct, and pay and 
performance are decoupled, “many of the practices Bebchuk 
and Fried condemn as products of management power take 
on a more benign appearance.”57 If, however, there is a link 
between pay and performance—a link which the evidence 
suggests is weaker than “commonly supposed”—“Bebchuk 
and Fried’s observation that executives receive a 
considerable amount of pay that is not performance­
sensitive has far less policy­making traction than they claim 
for it.”58 
In their 2007 book, Myths and Realities of Executive 
Pay, Ira Kay and Steven Van Putten present a different 
view of executive pay than Bebchuk and Fried—one that 
establishes a successful pay for performance structure, an 
efficient labor market, and an effective corporate 
governance model.59 In response to the argument that 
executive pay is not tied to corporate performance, Kay and 
Van Putten set forth substantial evidence to support their 
conclusion that “[f]or most companies, there is substantial 
pay­for­performance sensitivity. Simply put, high 
performance generates high pay, and low performance 
generates low pay.”60 Based on their analysis, Kay and Van 
Putten make a number of conclusions about the U.S. pay for 
performance system, including the fact that executives 
generally receive only a small portion of the value that they 
create for corporations and their shareholders,61 that 
  
This Review Essay is not intended to provide a complete literature 
review. Instructively, however, a number of scholars who have 
undertaken a more exhaustive review of the literature have concluded 
that the evidence is considerably less compelling than Bebchuk and 
Fried claim. 
Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1631 (footnote omitted). 
 56. Bainbridge, supra note 49, at 1632. 
 57. Id. at 1634. 
 58. Id. at 1637. 
 59. IRA T. KAY & STEVEN VAN PUTTEN, MYTHS AND REALITIES OF EXECUTIVE 
PAY 1­3 (2007). 
 60. Id. at 10. 
 61. Id. at 10­12. 
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executive pay rises and falls with corporate financial 
performance,62 and that a highly competitive executive labor 
market leads to pay packages that reflect the need to recruit 
qualified talent.63 
In discussing the managerial power theory, Kay and 
Van Putten note that the research sparked by Pay Without 
Performance generally criticizes the managerial power 
theory and rejects the policy implications that flow 
therefrom.64 These authors conclude that, based on the 
  
 62. Id. at 15­17. 
 63. Id. at 17­20. 
 64. Id. at 30; see, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance: 
The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMORY L.J. 1557, 1578 (2005) (“One theoretical 
weakness of the managerial power approach is that it assumes that CEO 
influence over the compensation process translates into inefficient compensation 
contracts. This assumption ignores, however, the fact that in the principal­agent 
model firm performance is itself a function of the compensation contract. In 
other words, by specifying a more efficient compensation contract, the incomes 
of both shareholders and executives can be increased.”); Randall S. Thomas, 
Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1173­82 (2004) (arguing that the pay gap between U.S. 
and international CEOs is market driven); Core et al., supra note 43, at 1182 
("Bebchuck and Fried's policy recommendations for government intervention are 
based on their assessment that executive pay practices are failing, which we do 
not believe to be true. Therefore, we see no broad justification for the policy 
recommendations that they give."); see also supra note 44 (Professor Murphy 
quote). Kay and Van Putten note that:  
Most academics, board members, and compensation consultants, 
and certainly all large­company executives, think that Bebchuk and 
Fried’s theory is deeply flawed. In fact, the academics—the most 
independent and scientific commentators in this whole matter—have 
found that the U.S. executive compensation model benefits the U.S. 
economy . . . . 
But Bebchuk and Fried’s theory has received a warm response from 
the media, including the New York Times and The Economist; selected 
executive compensation critics, such as Arthur Levitt, former SEC 
chairman; and some institutional investors—especially those 
representing unionized employees and state employees. And even 
though the larger institutional funds have criticisms of executive pay, 
they are generally satisfied with the outcome: the return to them as 
shareholders. If they could achieve the same returns for less executive 
pay, they would certainly install that model. Their shareholding and 
proxy voting behavior suggests, however, that they doubt a different 
model would produce the same results. 
KAY & VAN PUTTEN, supra note 59, at 33. 
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research, “while there is a great amount of managerial 
power inside the corporation, it is trumped by pay­for­
performance, balanced bargaining power, and other 
attributes of the CEO labor market.”65 
So, has either side convincingly made its case regarding 
the reasonableness of executive compensation?  Perhaps the 
best way to conclude a summary of the existing debate over 
executive compensation is to end where we began, noting 
that: 
As with most normative questions, the question of whether 
CEOs are appropriately compensated perhaps cannot be decided 
based on compelling, conclusive evidence to support an answer. 
. . . Ultimately, whether one believes that CEOs are over or 
appropriately compensated probably is a personal judgment. Each 
of us may have our own personal answer, but it would be difficult 
to argue that it is the right answer. 
. . . Whether executive compensation is excessive or equitable 
appears to remain an open question in spite of the many 
arguments and research on the topic.66 
  
 65. KAY & VAN PUTTEN, supra note 59, at 30. In one challenge to Bebchuk and 
Fried, Professor Randall Thomas proposes five alternative theories for why U.S. 
CEOs are paid more than their foreign counterparts.  Thomas, supra note 64, at 
1176. Professor Thomas concludes:    
In my view, economic forces are the most important factor in the 
determination of the market pay rate for CEOs and other top 
executives. The CEO’s contribution to her firm’s value, or the top 
executive’s best alternative job opportunities, are powerful explanations 
of her relative pay scale. It seems unlikely that these values are fixed 
through some massive secret conspiracy to keep managerial pay levels 
high.  
Id. at 1265. 
 66. Donald Nichols & Chandra Subramaniam, Executive Compensation: 
Excessive or Equitable?, 29 J. BUS. ETHICS 339, 349 (2001). Even if corporate 
executives are overcompensated, this may not represent a problem. Professor 
Yablon states that: 
But is such overcompensation a problem? The dominant perspective 
in the press and among many politicians is to assume that there is 
something deeply wrong when corporate CEOs pay themselves 
millions in salaries while closing plants and laying off thousands of 
workers. But this is fundamentally an argument about  
appearances. . . . 
While it is hard to find anyone in public life willing to respond with 
a hearty “So what?” to the evidence that American CEOs are grossly 
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C. Abandoned Attempts to Regulate Executive Pay 
Although the question of whether executive 
compensation is excessive remains an open one, there have 
been attempts to limit such compensation through the Code 
since the public outrage over executive pay began.67 While it 
might seem prudent to determine that a problem exists 
before attempting to provide solutions,68 Congress has not 
seen fit to wait.  
For example, in the 1930s, there were several 
unsuccessful attempts to impose excise taxes on “excessive” 
compensation. In 1932, the Senate Finance Committee 
proposed both adding an eighty percent surtax on 
compensation above $75,000 and eliminating the 
corporation’s deduction for the same.69 According to the 
  
overcompensated, there is much economic literature to support 
precisely that position. Economic theory has long recognized that 
whenever there is a separation of ownership and control in a firm, a 
potential conflict of interest is created between the owners of the firm 
and the agents they hire to run the business. This problem of agency 
cost is exacerbated in the public corporation, no single owner of which 
has a sufficient incentive to monitor corporate management and to 
seek the reduction of such agency costs. It is perfectly plausible to 
argue, and many economists do, that a certain amount of self­serving 
behavior by corporate managers—including payment to themselves of 
excessive compensation—is simply the cost of doing business and part 
of the costs inherent in the use of the public corporation as the 
primary vehicle for carrying on economic activity in the United States. 
Yablon, supra note 24, at 1874­75 (footnotes omitted). But see Jerry W. 
Markham, Regulating Excessive Executive Compensation—Why Bother?, 2 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 277 (2007) (asking not “so what?” but “why bother?” with 
respect to the question of whether the government should have a role in policing 
executive compensation). 
 67. See infra text accompanying notes 69­83. 
 68. This is not an original notion. See Loewenstein, supra note 34, at 4 (“No 
serious consideration of solutions to the ‘problem’ of executive compensation 
should proceed before determining whether, in fact, CEOs are overpaid.”). 
 69. See S. REP. NO. 72­665, at 13­14 (1932). The Senate Report notes that 
with respect to the eighty percent surtax on excess compensation, the 
“committee believes that under present circumstances compensation, to the 
extent that it exceeds compensation at a rate of $75,000 per year, should not be 
regarded as reasonable compensation for income­tax purposes . . . .” Id. at 13. 
With respect to the compensation deduction, the report notes that “the payment 
of any compensation to any person of an amount which exceeds compensation at 
the rate of $75,000 per year should be regarded, for income tax purposes, as in 
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Report of the Senate Finance Committee, the “large 
amounts of compensation, particularly in the form of 
bonuses, emoluments, and rewards frequently paid to the 
officials of corporations are greatly in excess of reasonable 
compensation.”70 In 1934, a brief outcry for taxes made a 
similar proposal appear more likely to pass.71 But limits on 
executive compensation failed to appear in the Revenue Act 
of 1934.72 During the drafting of the 1934 Act, Texas 
Senator William McFarlane proposed the creation of a 
steeply graduated income tax that “would confiscate 
incomes as they approached $1 million.”73 Although Senator 
McFarlane’s highly­progressive tax rates would have 
affected all incomes (whether from executive compensation 
or otherwise), his unsubstantiated statements made on the 
Senate floor—citing salaries and bonuses granted to 
executives at large U.S. corporations (specifically, American 
Tobacco and Bethlehem Steel)—reflected his belief that the 
increased compensation paid to corporate executives was 
not justified by an increase in corporate responsibilities.74 
  
excess of reasonable compensation for personal services actually rendered . . . .” 
Id. at 14. 
 70. Id. at 13. 
 71. See Wells, supra note 20, at 751 (citing Big Salaries Bring Demand for 
Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1934, at 6); see also Philip M. Payne, Corporation 
Salaries and Bonuses and The Federal Income Tax, 12 TAX. MAG. 301, 333­34 
(1934) (noting these amendments proposed by Senator Al Gore Sr. and another 
proposal by Senator McKellar that would have denied a deduction for salary or 
compensation in excess of $50,000 per year). 
 72. See Wells, supra note 20, at 751 (citing MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF 
SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933­1939, at 88­89 (1984)).  
 73. Id. (citing 79 CONG. REC. 10,983­84 (1935) (statement of Sen. 
McFarlane)). Senator McFarlane’s proposal called for a surtax to be placed on 
net income which would have the effect of “placing a ceiling on personal incomes 
of not to exceed $1,000 per week or about $52,000 net per year.” 79 CONG. REC. 
10,984 (1935) (statement of Sen. McFarlane). 
 74.  79 CONG. REC. 10,984 (1935) (statement of Sen. McFarlane). Senator 
McFarlane concluded that: 
The additional pay in no sense represents earned incomes, but are paid 
by reason of the fact that these individuals are able to dominate and 
control oftentimes with very little actual ownership of the business. The 
excessive salaries which they receive represent accumulated profits 
diverted from the stockholders into their pockets. The salary of the 
President of this country is only $75,000. I believe no officer in 
commercial enterprises should receive more.  
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In 1992, shortly before the enactment of Section 162(m), 
Senator Tom Harkin introduced legislation that would have 
amended Section 162 to redefine the term “reasonable 
allowance for salaries or other compensation” to include 
only the first $500,000.75 Senator Tom Daschle introduced a 
similar bill that would have allowed the $500,000 limitation 
to be increased for cost­of­living adjustments.76 
In another attempt to legislate executive pay, 
Representative Martin Sabo introduced a bill in every 
session of Congress beginning in 1991 until his retirement 
in 2006 that would have disallowed a tax deduction for 
executive salaries in excess of twenty­five times the salary 
of the lowest paid employee in the same organization.77 
None of these bills were ever voted upon.78 After 
  
 Id. 
 75. S. 2329, 102d Cong. (1992). See also infra Part III.A. 
 76. S. 2261, 102d Cong. (1992). 
 77. See Income Disparities Act of 1991, H.R. 3056, 102nd Cong. (1991); 
Income Equity Act of 1993, H.R. 3278, 103rd Cong. (1993); Income Equity Act of 
1995, H.R. 620, 104th Cong. (1995); Income Equity Act of 1997, H.R. 687, 105th 
Cong. (1997); Income Equity Act of 1999, H.R. 740, 106th Cong. (1999); Income 
Equity Act of 2001, H.R. 2691, 107th Cong. (2001); Income Equity Act of 2003, 
H.R. 2888, 108th Cong. (2003); Income Equity Act of 2005, H.R. 3260, 109th 
Cong. (2005). 
 78. An article in New York Magazine best summarizes the legislation 
proposed by Representative Sabo: 
On the House side, a rather poorly thought­out and simplistic bill by 
Democrat Martin Sabo of Minnesota would set an arbitrary ceiling on 
how much money chief executives should be paid; any portion of an 
executive’s salary that is more than 25 times the salary of the lowest­
paid full­time employee in the company would not be deductible by the 
company as a business expense. 
Why 25 times? Sabo explains that he used the current minimum 
wage as a starting point and found that a 25­times increase would 
result in a salary of roughly $200,000. “That’s what the President of 
the United States gets,” says Sabo. “Why should some corporate 
executive get more?” 
Christopher Byron, Strike It Rich: On the CEO Pay Patrol, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 17, 
1992, at 21. Representative Sabo’s rationale for limiting executive compensation 
to the salary paid to the President of the United States is reminiscent of the 
statements made by Senator McFarlane more than one­half century earlier. See 
79 Cong. Rec. 10,984 (1935) (statement of Sen. McFarlane). Both statements 
might remind readers of Babe Ruth’s statement regarding his own 
compensation. In 1930, when asked by a reporter what he thought of the fact 
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Representative Sabo retired from the House of 
Representatives, Representative Barbara Lee assumed 
responsibility for his crusade.79 To date, Representative 
Lee’s bills have met the same fate. 
A more recent attempt to enact tax provisions to 
regulate executive pay arose in the wake of widespread 
public outrage over reports of American International 
Group, Inc.’s (“AIG”) payment of large retention bonuses 
after receiving more than $170 billion in government 
assistance.80 In 2009, the House of Representatives passed a 
  
that his annual salary of $80,000 was greater than the $75,000 annual salary 
earned by President Hoover, Ruth responded, “I know, but I had a better year 
than Hoover.” See Norman Chad, Just a Little History, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 
2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp­dyn/articles/A52356­2004Sep26.html.  
 79. Income Equity Act of 2007, H.R. 3876, 110th Cong. (2007); Income Equity 
Act of 2009, H.R. 1594, 111th Cong. (2009); Income Equity Act of 2011, H.R. 
382, 112th Cong. (2011). It should be noted that, beginning with the 2009 bill, 
Representative Lee’s proposed legislation would eliminate the deduction for 
executive compensation in excess of the greater of $500,000 or twenty­five times 
the compensation paid any other employee. In addition, such legislation 
expands the definition of “compensation” to include a wider array of fringe 
benefits. Compare H.R. 3876 with H.R. 1594. 
 80. See, for example, Tim Reid, Outrage Over AIG Bonuses Threatens to 
Derail Obama’s Rescue Plans, TIMES (London), Mar. 19, 2009, 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_fin
ance/article5934395.ece, describing the “tidal wave of public anger” as follows: 
The enormous public anger and outrage on Capitol Hill stems from the 
fact that the bonuses paid to 418 employees, including $1 million each 
to 73 people, came after the company had been rescued with $170 
billion of taxpayers’ money. It comprises the biggest injection of public 
cash into a single company since the financial crisis began last year, 
and another $30 billion will be paid soon. 
Id.; see also Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract 
Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 368, 369 (2009) (“Responding to public outrage, the House of 
Representatives sought to impose a retroactive marginal taxation rate of ninety 
percent on the AIG bonuses (as of the date of this writing, the bonus tax had 
passed in the House of Representatives, but not the Senate).” (citing John 
Christoffersen, AIG Execs’ Lavish Homes Draw Busload of Activists, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at A4)); Michael M. Phillips, Outrage Overflows on 
Capitol Hill as Lawmakers Denounce Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at 
A4; Liam Pleven et al., AIG Faces Growing Wrath over Payouts, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 16, 2009, at A1; Jonathan Weisman et al., Treasury Will Make Grab to 
Recoup Bonus Funds, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009, at A1. For an example of a 
statement of Congressional outrage, see supra note 33. 
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bill that would have imposed a tax at a rate of ninety 
percent on certain bonuses paid to individuals with adjusted 
gross incomes over $250,000 by financial institutions that 
received more than $5 billion in federal assistance under 
the Treasury Department’s Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(“TARP”).81 The tax imposed by the proposed bill, H.R. 1586, 
would have been in addition to any other tax imposed by the 
Code (including any income tax), but would not have 
applied if the recipient irrevocably waived his or her 
entitlement to such bonus or returned such amount to his or 
her employer “before the close of the taxable year in which 
such payment [was] due.”82 A similar bill was introduced in 
the Senate, but was never brought to a vote.83 
Not all attempts to limit executive compensation 
through the Code have failed to survive the legislative 
process. In fact, several provisions currently exist to deny a 
deduction, impose a tax surcharge, or to accelerate the 
inclusion of income for compensation that Congress has 
determined should not be subsidized by the taxpayers.84 
However, as discussed herein, all of these provisions set 
forth bright­line standards to determine which portion of 
the compensation qualifies for a tax deduction and for which 
portion public subsidization is unavailable.85 
  
 81. See H.R. 1586, 111th Cong. (2009) (imposing an additional tax on bonuses 
received from certain TARP recipients). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, S. 651, 111th Cong. (2009). The 
Senate version of the excise tax on excessive compensation provided for a tax at 
a rate of seventy percent—split equally between the employer and the 
employee—on the amount of any bonus payment in excess of $50,000 paid to 
certain employees of TARP recipients. Id. It should be noted that outrage over 
the TARP bailout did result in some changes to the Code affecting the executive 
compensation provisions in Sections 162(m) and 280G. See Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110­343, § 302, 122 Stat. 3765, 3803­06. A 
discussion of these provisions is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion 
of Section 162(m), see Part III.A.  For a discussion of Section 280G, see Part 
III.B. 
  84. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2010); I.R.C. § 280G (West 2010); I.R.C. § 409A 
(2006); I.R.C. § 4999 (West 2010).  
  85. See infra Part III. 
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II. INTERPRETING THE CODE TO ADDRESS UNREASONABLE 
PUBLIC COMPANY COMPENSATION 
While the Code has certain objective standards for 
determining whether compensation paid by a public 
company is reasonable,86 the question may be raised as to 
whether the tax laws should go further in attempting to 
limit executive compensation. While numerous articles have 
previously concluded that the limitation on deductions for a 
reasonable allowance for compensation applies only to 
closely held companies,87 one commentator has recently 
called for the Service to step in and regulate executive 
compensation by unilaterally expanding the scope of its 
amorphous statutory authority under Section 162(a)(1) to 
deny deductions for compensation paid to executives of 
public companies that are not “reasonable” in amount.88 In a 
recently published piece, Aaron Zelinsky argues that the 
Service has consistently misapplied the statute by failing to 
treat publicly traded and privately held corporations in a 
similar manner.89 
Part IV of this Article provides a further critique of 
Zelinsky’s views. His argument is incorrect for two reasons. 
First, as discussed in this Part, such an approach is 
inconsistent with Congress’ intent in enacting Section 
162(a)(1) and its predecessors, the plain meaning of the 
statute, and prior application of such provisions. Second, as 
discussed in Part III, past attempts to limit compensation of 
corporate managers have led to increased executive pay 
rather than controlling such amounts. 
  
  86. See infra Part III. 
 87. See, e.g., Conway, supra note 24, at 392; Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence 
and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 508­09 (2009); Stabile, supra note 24, at 85; 
Andrew W. Stumpff, The Reasonable Compensation Rule, 19 VA. TAX REV. 371, 
375­76 (1999); Ryan Miske, Note, Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended 
Consequences of Trying to Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax 
Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1676 (2004). 
 88. See Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 638. 
  89. See id. 
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A. Section 162(a)(1): Deducting a Reasonable Allowance for 
Compensation 
The Code provides that “[t]here shall be allowed as a 
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or 
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or 
business.”90 This business expense deduction is part of the 
framework of our tax system, which divides a taxpayer’s 
expenditures into three categories: business expenses, 
business expenditures, and personal expenses. Only 
amounts that fall within the first of these three categories 
are immediately deductible under Section 162(a).91 Business 
expenditures are required to be capitalized, and may only be 
depreciated or amortized over time in accordance with their 
useful life or under another method specifically prescribed 
by the Code.92 Personal expenses are generally 
nondeductible, although certain Code provisions do allow 
individuals to deduct certain personal expenses.93 
Section 162(a)(1) provides one such deductible business 
expense—a deduction for “a reasonable allowance for 
salaries or other compensation for personal services actually 
rendered.”94 However, neither the Code nor the Treasury 
  
 90. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006). 
 91. I.R.C. § 162(a).  
 92. I.R.C. § 263 (2006); see, e.g., I.R.C. § 167 (West 2010); I.R.C. § 168 (West 
2010); I.R.C. § 179 (West 2010); I.R.C. § 195 (West 2010); I.R.C. § 248 (2006); 
I.R.C. § 709 (2006). 
 93. I.R.C. § 262 (2006). Professor Marvin Chirelstein notes that: 
Business expenses—the costs incurred by the taxpayer in earning gross 
income—are nondiscretionary in the sense that the income is 
conditioned on the outlay. Personal expenditures reflect the disposition 
which the taxpayer elects to make out of the wealth that she has 
earned. Business expenses must necessarily be deductible if the income 
tax is to be imposed on “income”; for the same reason, personal 
expenditures should be disallowed. 
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 103 (11th ed. 2009). 
Professor Chirelstein also states that “[w]hile the line between business and 
personal expense is of the essence in all this, the fact is that Congress itself has 
chosen to cross that line fairly freely by allowing deductions for a variety of 
items which are plainly personal in nature.” Id. at 104. 
 94. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1). The initial language of Section 162(a) provides a 
general rule that ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in 
connection with carrying on a trade or business should be deductible, while at 
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regulations define what constitutes a “reasonable allowance 
for salaries or other compensation.”95 Rather, whether 
compensation is reasonable is based on all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the payment.96 One 
commentator notes, with disapproval, that “[n]evertheless, 
the IRS has systematically interpreted § 162(a)(1) to apply 
only to closely held corporations, effectively concluding that 
‘any amount of compensation paid by a publicly held 
corporation should be per se reasonable,’ even though § 
162(a)(1) does not differentiate between the reasonableness 
of publicly owned and privately held corporations.”97 
  
the same time—through the use of the word “including”—provides three specific 
examples of deductible business expenses. See I.R.C. § 162(a). Although 
numerous cases stand for the proposition that deductions should be narrowly 
construed, there is no authority providing that these three examples are all­
inclusive. See, e.g., INDOPCO v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial 
Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934); see also infra text accompanying 
notes 138­43.  
 95. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.162­7 (2010). See also Zelinsky, 
supra note 13, at 639 n.8 (“The term ‘reasonable compensation’ is not defined by 
the tax code or the Treasury regulations.” (quoting Conway, supra note 24, at 
391)). In addition, Anne Moran notes:  
The concept of reasonableness for compensation presents the same 
types of issues that it does in limiting a reasonable allowance for 
depreciation or depletion, and in computing the reasonable needs of a 
business for purposes of the accumulated earnings tax. The concept 
defies simple interpretation by tax experts in the same manner that 
the hypothetical reasonable man escapes precise definition by 
negligence lawyers and the concept of reasonable doubt remains an 
elusive factor in criminal law. 
Anne E. Moran, Reasonable Compensation, 390­5th TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS 
(BNA), at A­3 (2011) (footnotes omitted). 
  96. See E. Wagner & Son v. Comm’r, 93 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1937). 
 97. Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 639 (quoting Anne E. Moran, Reasonable 
Compensation, 390­4th TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS (BNA), at III.B.4 (2009)); see 
also Conway, supra note 24, at 392 (“[Courts] have applied the [§ 162(a)(1)] 
standard primarily to limit payments by closely held companies where those 
companies have tried to disguise nondeductible dividends as compensation 
which would be deductible.”); Stumpff, supra note 87, at 377 (“Reasonable 
compensation cases virtually always involve a fact pattern . . . [with] . . . 
payments to an employee who is also a shareholder of a closely­held 
corporation.”); Miske, supra note 87, at 1676 (“The concept of reasonableness is 
primarily intended to stop closely held businesses from artificially increasing 
employee compensation in an attempt to disburse profits in a deductible form, 
as opposed to a nondeductible form such as gifts or dividends.”). 
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Zelinsky is correct in stating that the reasonableness 
standard traditionally has been applied only to 
compensation paid by closely held corporations. Case law 
and legislative history show, however, that his view of the 
expansive nature of such provision is both erroneous and 
lacks support. 
Prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1913, a 
similar issue was analyzed under the Payne­Aldrich Tariff 
Act.98 In United States v. Philadelphia Knitting Mills Co., 
the Third Circuit was confronted with the issue of whether 
a corporation could be denied a deduction for salary paid to 
its president on the grounds that such amount was 
unreasonable.99 At the trial court level, the district court 
ruled that a deduction could not be denied based on the 
amount paid, but only based upon evidence that the 
payment was, “in whole or in part, [a] distribution[] of 
profit[].”100 The district court ruled for the taxpayer.101 On 
appeal, the Third Circuit agreed that the government could 
not, absent statutory authority, inquire into the 
reasonableness of the compensation paid.102 The court, 
  
 98. Ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11 (1909) (repealed 1913). The Payne­Aldrich Tariff Act of 
1909 imposed an excise tax on corporations for the privilege of doing business in 
corporate form. See id. §38, 36 Stat. at 112. The amount of excise tax imposed 
was measured by corporate income. Id. 
 99. 273 F. 657, 658 (3d Cir. 1921). 
 100. Id. at 657­58. 
 101. United States v. Phila. Knitting Mills Co., 268 F. 270, 272 (E.D. Pa. 
1920). 
 102. United States v. Phila. Knitting Mills Co., 273 F. 657 (3d Cir. 1921).  The 
court stated that: 
Confining our inquiry to the statute, it appears that the basis on 
which a salary may be allowed as a valid deduction is that it was in 
fact an “ordinary and necessary expense (of the corporation) actually 
paid . . . in the maintenance and operation of its business.” . . . 
Whether services were rendered and whether also they were 
commensurate with the salary paid are matters of judgment and 
discretion reposed by general law in the board of directors of the 
corporation. As the board of directors is charged with the duty and 
clothed with the discretion of fixing the salaries of the corporation’s 
officers, the Government has no right (until expressly granted by 
statute) to inquire into and determine whether the amounts thereof 
are proper, that is, whether they are too much or too little. But, while 
the amount of salary fixed by a board of directors is presumptively 
valid, it is not conclusively so, because the Government may inquire 
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however, found sufficient evidence existed that the 
compensation paid was not entirely salary, but rather part 
of the corporation’s profits paid to a shareholder, and 
remanded the case back to the district court on such 
grounds.103 
Both the Revenue Act of 1913 and the Revenue Act of 
1916 allowed an unqualified deduction for “ordinary and 
necessary expenses.”104 Language relating to a deduction for 
compensation was first added to the statutory lexicon with 
the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1918.105 However, the 
congressional committee reports relating to the 1918 Act 
shed no light on the rationale for adding this specific 
reference.106 Two conflicting arguments have been advanced 
for this statutory change. The first asserts that the 
language added in 1918 was intended to limit the business 
expense deduction, while the other contends that the new 
language was intended to expand the scope of such 
deduction.107 
  
whether the amount paid is salary or something else. . . . It has a 
right, therefore, to attack the action of a board of directors and show 
by evidence, not that a given salary is too much, but that, in the 
circumstances, the whole or some part of it is not salary at all but is 
profits diverted to a stockholding officer under the guise of salary and 
as such is subject to taxation. 
Id. at 658­59. 
 103. Id. at 659­60. 
 104. See Moran, supra note 95, at A­1 ­ A­2. See also Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 
16, § II(g)(b), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (providing corporations with a deduction for “all 
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid within the year in the maintenance 
and operation of its business and properties . . . .”); Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 
§ 12(a), 39 Stat. 756, 762 (providing the same deduction for corporations). 
 105. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919) (with 
respect to individuals); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a)(1), 40 Stat. at 1077 
(1919) (with respect to corporations). Each of these provisions provide a 
deduction for “[a]ll the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during 
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable 
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually 
rendered . . . .” Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a)(1), 40 Stat. at 1066 (1919); 
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 234(a)(1), 40 Stat. at 1077 (1919). 
 106. See H.R. REP. NO. 1037 (1919), reprinted in 1939­1 C.B. (Part 2) 130­67; 
H.R. REP. NO. 767 (1918), reprinted in 1939­1 C.B. (Part 2) 86­117; SEN. REP. 
NO. 617 (1918), reprinted in 1939­1 C.B. (Part 2) 117­130. 
 107. See Moran, supra note 95, at A­1 ­ A­2. 
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The argument for a restrictive interpretation for the 
business expense deduction—i.e., that the Service should 
impose a “reasonableness” requirement on compensation—
looks to the regulations promulgated under the Revenue Act 
of 1916.108 The language serving as evidence for such 
conclusion provides that, with respect to employee bonuses: 
If such payments, when added to the stipulated salaries, do not 
exceed a reasonable compensation for the services rendered, they 
will be regarded as a part of the wage or hire of the employee, and 
therefore an ordinary and necessary expense of operation and 
maintenance, and as such deductible from gross income.109 
According to one commentator, this regulation proves 
that the concept of reasonableness in the regulations was 
intended as a limiting factor reflecting the Service’s desire 
to police compensation deductions, “particularly in the case 
of closely held or related taxpayers.”110 “The statutory 
reasonable compensation clause appears to have been the 
normal outgrowth of this administrative position.”111 
A closer analysis of these regulations, and of other 
regulations promulgated around that time, leads to a 
different conclusion. While Treasury Regulations 
promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1913 made no 
reference to reasonable compensation, such regulations 
provided that “[a]mounts . . . based upon the stockholdings 
of such officers or employees, are held to be dividends, and 
although paid in lieu of salaries or wages, are not allowable 
deductions from gross income, for the reason that dividends 
are not deductible.”112 Treasury Regulations promulgated 
under the Revenue Act of 1916 similarly disallowed a 
deduction for payments purportedly labeled as salaries 
through the imposition of a reasonableness test designed to 
determine whether such amounts were, in reality, disguised 
dividends.113 Similarly, the language cited above from these 
  
 108. Id. 
 109. Treas. Reg. 33 (Rev.), art. 138 (1918). 
 110. Moran, supra note 95, at A­2. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Treas.  Reg. 33, art. 119 (1914). 
 113. See Treas. Reg. 33 (Rev.), art. 138 (1918), which provides that: 
  Salaries of officers or employees who are stockholders will be subject 
to careful analysis, and if they are found to be out of proportion to the 
 
964 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59  
same regulations in support of imposing a reasonableness 
requirement on bonuses reads in full as follows: 
Special payments, sometimes denominated as gifts or bonuses to 
employees of corporations, will constitute allowable deductions 
from gross income in ascertaining net income for the purpose of 
the income tax, when such payments are made in good faith and 
as additional compensation for the services actually rendered by 
the employees. If such payments, when added to the stipulated 
salaries, do not exceed a reasonable compensation for the services 
rendered, they will be regarded as a part of the wage or hire of the 
employee, and therefore an ordinary and necessary expense of 
operation and maintenance, and as such deductible from gross 
income.114 
When read in this light, it is clear that the 
reasonableness of the compensation or bonuses paid to 
corporate employees should not be determined in the 
abstract.115 The concept of reasonable compensation was 
intended solely to distinguish payments of compensation 
from payments that represented gifts or dividends, and not 
to impose a requirement that actual payments of 
compensation be reasonable in order to allow the payor a 
tax deduction.116 In fact, with respect to gifts and bonuses, 
rather than limiting the deductibility of payments, the 
regulations intended to expand their deductibility by 
reclassifying amounts paid as gifts or bonuses as deductible 
compensation in situations where such amounts do not 
exceed a reasonable level of compensation.117 This language 
does not address amounts already classified as 
  
volume of business transacted, or excessive when compared with the 
salaries of like officers or employees of other corporations doing a 
similar kind or volume of business, the amount so paid in excess of 
reasonable compensation for the services will not be deductible from 
gross income, but will be treated as a distribution of profits. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Note, The Deduction of a “Reasonable Allowance for Salaries”—The 
Undefined Power of the Commissioner, 56 HARV. L. REV. 997, 998 (1943) (“It 
thus appears that the notion of reasonable allowance was designed to help 
distinguish compensation payments from gifts, while the distinction between 
salaries and dividends was made to turn upon the relationship of the payment 
to the capital invested in the business.”). 
 116. Treas. Reg. 33 (Rev.), art. 138 (1918). 
 117. Id. 
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compensation. Current regulations also support this 
reading of prior regulations.118 
  
 118. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162­7, ­8, ­9 (1960). In fairness to those that support 
a narrower view of the reasonable compensation limitation in Section 162(a)(1), 
Treasury Regulation Section 1.162­7(b)(3) does provide that “[i]n any event the 
allowance for the compensation paid may not exceed what is reasonable under 
all the circumstances.” However, most of the current regulations relating to the 
compensation deduction focus on the relationship between the payor and the 
payee in determining whether such payments should be allowed as a 
compensation deduction rather than the absolute amount. See, for example, 
Treasury Regulation Section 1.162­7(b)(1), which provides that: 
(b) The test set forth in paragraph (a) of this section and its practical 
application may be further stated and illustrated as follows: 
(1) Any amount paid in the form of compensation, but not in 
fact as the purchase price of services, is not deductible. An 
ostensible salary paid by a corporation may be a distribution of 
a dividend on stock. This is likely to occur in the case of a 
corporation having few shareholders, practically all of whom 
draw salaries. If in such a case the salaries are in excess of 
those ordinarily paid for similar services and the excessive 
payments correspond or bear a close relationship to the 
stockholdings of the officers or employees, it would seem likely 
that the salaries are not paid wholly for services rendered, but 
that the excessive payments are a distribution of earnings 
upon the stock. An ostensible salary may be in part payment 
for property. This may occur, for example, where a partnership 
sells out to a corporation, the former partners agreeing to 
continue in the service of the corporation. In such a case it may 
be found that the salaries of the former partners are not 
merely for services, but in part constitute payment for the 
transfer of their business. 
In addition, see Treasury Regulation Section 1.162­8, which states that: 
The income tax liability of the recipient in respect of an amount 
ostensibly paid to him as compensation, but not allowed to be deducted 
as such by the payor, will depend upon the circumstances of each case. 
Thus, in the case of excessive payments by corporations, if such 
payments correspond or bear a close relationship to stockholdings, and 
are found to be a distribution of earnings or profits, the excessive 
payments will be treated as a dividend. If such payments constitute 
payment for property, they should be treated by the payor as a capital 
expenditure and by the recipient as part of the purchase price. 
For a regulation focusing on both the relationship between the payor and payee, 
as well as the amount of the payment, see Treasury Regulation Section 1.162­9, 
which provides that “[d]onations made to employees and others, which do not 
have in them the element of compensation or which are in excess of reasonable 
compensation for services, are not deductible from gross income.” 
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Professor Erwin Griswold argues for a more expansive 
business expense deduction, stating that the purpose of the 
reasonable allowance language “was to enlarge the 
deduction . . . by allowing a deduction for amounts which 
had not actually been paid . . . .”119 According to Professor 
Griswold, “there is no foundation in the statute for [using 
the reasonable allowance language] as a means of 
restricting the deduction of amounts which had actually 
been paid.”120 Professor Griswold notes that such language 
first appeared in regulations in order to ease the hardship 
caused by the Excess Profits Tax of 1917121 on businesses 
that paid little or no compensation to its owners/officers­
employees.122 According to one commentator, Congress later   
 119. See Erwin N. Griswold, Note, New Light on “A Reasonable Allowance for 
Salaries,” 59 HARV. L. REV. 286, 290 (1945) (emphasis omitted). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Ch. 159, 39 Stat. 1000.  
 122. See Treas. Reg. 41, art. 39 (1918); Griswold, supra note 119, at 288­89. 
With respect to individuals, these regulations provided that: 
An individual carrying on a trade or business having an invested 
capital may in computing the net income of the trade or business for 
purposes of the excess profits tax deduct a reasonable amount 
designated by him as salary or compensation for personal service 
actually rendered by him in the conduct of such trade or business. In no 
case shall the amount so designated be in excess of the salaries or 
compensation customarily paid for similar service under like 
responsibilities by corporations or partnerships engaged in like or 
similar trades or businesses. 
Treas. Reg. 41, art. 32 (1918). Additionally, regulations provided that 
partnerships could deduct reasonable salaries or compensation paid to 
individual partners for personal services actually rendered during the taxable 
year if the payment were made in accordance with prior agreements and were 
properly recorded on the books of the partnership. See id. Similar relief from the 
Excess Profits Tax was provided to closely held corporations through a Treasury 
Department publication. See Griswold, supra note 119, at 288 (citing OFFICE OF 
THE COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, EXCESS PROFITS 
TAX PRIMER ¶ 51 (1918)). The Excess Profits Tax Primer provided: 
51.  A corporation in which most of the stock is owned by its officers 
has in the past voted to its officers only nominal salaries as drawing 
accounts. In computing net income for purposes of the excess­profits tax 
may the corporation deduct as items of expense amounts which would 
constitute reasonable compensation for the services actually rendered 
by its officers? 
Yes, if a satisfactory explanation is given. For any period prior to 
March 1, 1918, reasonable salaries for services actually rendered may 
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incorporated the reasonable compensation clause in the 
Revenue Act of 1918 in order to furnish a statutory basis for 
the relief granted by these regulations.123 Case law and 
administrative pronouncements similarly support this 
view.124 
The Board of Tax Appeals, however, interpreted the 
new language found in the Revenue Act of 1918 to be a 
mandate to inquire into the reasonableness of compensation 
actually paid.125 This interpretation found approval with the 
courts.126 The interpretation is incorrect, though, when   
be deducted, even though the full amounts had not been formally voted 
as salaries by the corporation. 
EXCESS PROFITS TAX PRIMER, supra, ¶ 51. 
 123. See Moran, supra note 95, at A­2; see also Griswold, supra note 119, at 
288 (noting that the language of the Revenue Act of 1918 and the previous 
administrative authorities were “essentially the same”). 
 124. In Appeal of Gottlieb Bros., 1 B.T.A. 684 (1925), the Board of Tax Appeals 
relied on Treasury Regulation 41, Article 39 to allow a partnership deduction for 
reasonable salaries for services rendered even though such salaries were never 
paid. The Board concluded that: 
The regulation quoted seems to us reasonable and proper in the light of 
the whole intent and purpose of Title II of the Revenue Act of 1917. It 
certainly does justice where a strict application of the letter of the 
statute would do grave injustice. It has been regularly and consistently 
applied by the Commissioner from its promulgation in 1917 until at 
least as recently as February, 1924 (A.R.R. 6087, C.B. III­1, 128). 
Gottlieb Bros., 1 B.T.A at 686. In A.R.R. 6087, III­1 C.B. 128 (1924), the Board of 
Tax Appeals concluded that a partnership was entitled to deduct a reasonable 
amount for partners’ salaries for services even though no such payments had 
actually been made. The Board, in discussing the regulations, noted that the 
intent and purpose when drafting the regulations was to “recognize the 
unfortunate and inequitable position in which many partnerships had been 
placed by the advent of the excess­profits tax in 1917 without having had any 
previous income tax history or experience to guide them in the adjustment of 
their affairs so as to secure equitable salary deductions.” Id. at 129. The Board 
went on to note “it has been the practice of the Income Tax Unit to allow a 
reasonable amount for partners’ salaries . . . even though none were actually 
paid and no agreement existed for payment thereof.” Id. 
 125. See Moran, supra note 95, at A­2. 
 126. See id. (citing Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S. 115 (1930); 
Gustafson Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 1 B.T.A. 508 (1925)). In Gustafson, the court 
concluded that the compensation paid to the majority shareholder of a close 
corporation was not reasonable. 1 B.T.A. at 510. In so holding, however, the 
court did not distinguish between the compensation paid by a close corporation 
to a shareholder and compensation paid to persons who were not also 
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viewed in light of both the Congress’ intent in revising the 
statute and the statutory language. 
B. A Reasonable Allowance for Compensation Is Different 
Than Reasonable Compensation 
Having previously discussed Congress’ intent behind 
the 1918 addition of a deduction for a reasonable allowance 
for compensation,127 an exploration into the literal language 
of the statute is warranted. The Code does not specifically 
enumerate a deduction for reasonable compensation. 
Rather, Section 162(a) provides that “[t]here shall be 
allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary 
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in 
carrying on any trade or business, including . . . .”128 Section 
162(a)(1), which forms a part of this provision, permits a 
deduction for a “reasonable allowance for salaries or other 
compensation for personal services actually rendered.”129 By 
analyzing the statutory construction of Section 162(a), two 
distinct arguments develop. First, a deduction for a 
reasonable allowance for compensation is different than a 
deduction for reasonable compensation. Second, the 
language “including” should not be read as limiting. 
Only three Code sections use the term “reasonable 
allowance” in determining the amount of a deduction to 
which a taxpayer is entitled.130 All other Code provisions 
allowing taxpayers a deduction, including the general 
  
shareholders. According to the court, “[u]nder the provision of this section the 
Commissioner not only has the authority but it is his duty to determine under 
all the facts obtainable the reasonableness or unreasonableness of deductions by 
a corporate taxpayer of compensation paid.” Id. 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 112­24. 
 128. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006). 
 129. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1). 
 130. Section 162(a)(1) provides the deduction for a reasonable allowance for 
compensation for services actually rendered. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1). Section 167 
allows a depreciation deduction for a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, 
wear and tear, and obsolescence of property used in a trade or business or held 
for the production of income. I.R.C. § 167(a) (2006). Section 611(a) provides a 
reasonable allowance for depletion in the case of certain natural resources.  
I.R.C. § 611(a) (2006). 
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business expense deduction of Section 162(a), require that 
actual amounts be paid, incurred, or sustained.131 
In understanding the meaning behind such phrase, a 
few principles of statutory construction are relevant. First, 
“reasonable allowance” is a term of art, and should be 
afforded the general understanding given such term.132 
Second, as a matter of statutory construction, where the 
same phrase is used in one or more related statutes, it 
should be accorded the same meaning.133 Finally, where a 
different phrase is used in similar statutes, it should be 
accorded a different meaning.134 
Although the term “reasonable allowance” is used as a 
term of art in the Code and in tax parlance, not much is 
written about its meaning. However, where the term is 
used, it is generally presumed to mean an estimated, rather 
  
 131. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 2010) (providing a deduction for interest 
paid or accrued during the taxable year); I.R.C. § 164(a) (West 2010) (allowing a 
deduction for taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year); I.R.C. § 165(a) 
(2006) (providing a deduction for losses sustained during the year); I.R.C. § 
170(a) (2006) (allowing taxpayers to deduct charitable contributions made or, in 
the case of corporations on the accrual method of accounting, deemed made 
during the year); I.R.C. § 213 (2006) (allowing a deduction for medical expenses 
paid during the year not compensated for by insurance or otherwise); I.R.C. § 
215 (2006) (providing a deduction for actual amounts of alimony or separate 
maintenance paid during the year). 
 132. YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97­589 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 6 (2008). Kim states that: 
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the 
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably 
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each 
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the 
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise 
instructed. In such a case, absence of contrary direction may be taken 
as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as departure from 
them. 
Id.  (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (Jackson, J.)). 
 133. See id. at 13 (“A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is 
generally read the same way each time it appears.” (quoting Ratzlaf v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994))). 
 134. Id. at 14 (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section 
of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that Congress 
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” 
(quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993))). 
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than an actual, amount.135 Congress’ decision, then, to allow 
a deduction for a reasonable allowance for compensation 
rather than a deduction for reasonable amounts of 
compensation is significant. As a matter of statutory 
construction, the term “reasonable allowance” found in 
Section 162(a)(1) should be read in a manner similar to the 
same term in Section 167—as a deduction for an estimated 
amount—and should be distinguished from other provisions 
that allow a deduction for actual amounts.136 This is 
  
 135. See, for example, J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 1938­1861, at 968 (1938), where the legislative 
history to the Revenue Act of 1916 provides an interesting discussion of the 
meaning of such term in the context of the deduction for a reasonable allowance 
for actual reduction in flow and production in the case of oil and gas wells. In 
that discussion, Senators Lane and Williams argue the method of calculating 
such reasonable allowance. Senator Lane concludes that the amount is an 
estimate that is “merely arbitrary.” Id. In determining the deduction for 
traveling expenses under Section 162(a)(2), the Service permits taxpayers to 
take a deduction for a “per diem” (i.e., a standard allowance) for lodging, meals 
and automobile mileage. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 463, TRAVEL, 
ENTERTAINMENT, GIFT, AND CAR EXPENSES 4­7 (2011). Although the Service 
never defines the term “per diem,” a commonly accepted definition for such term 
is as follows: 
The meal per diem is a reasonable allowance for meals and incidental 
expenses for the area. It is not intended to be a reimbursement for 
actual expenses but rather a reasonable allowance. Some travelers may 
spend more than the amount for personal travel expenses while others 
may spend less than the M&IE per diem but the principle behind the 
per diem is that it is a reasonable amount to cover the traveler’s 
necessary expenses. 
Controller’s Office, Procedure 20335c: Meals & Incidental Expenses, VIRGINIA 
TECH, http//www.co.vt.edu/Procedures/p20335c.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
For an example of the use of the term “reasonable allowance” outside of tax law, 
see Kansas Statute section 50­645(c), which provides that “a reasonable 
allowance for the consumer’s use of the vehicle” is not an actual amount but an 
estimate based on a publication by the American Automobile Association. KAN 
STAT. ANN. § 5­645(c) (2011). A Minnesota statute provides an expense 
allowance for members of governmental boards or agencies set as “a reasonable 
allowance for expenses or a per diem allowance in lieu of expenses.” MINN. 
STAT. § 375.47 (2010). 
 136. In discussing the deductibility of intangibles under a “reasonable 
allowance” standard, the Supreme Court has noted that: 
[S]ince 1918, at least some intangible assets have been depreciable. 
Because intangible assets do not exhaust or waste away in the same 
manner as tangible assets, taxpayers must establish that public taste 
or other socioeconomic forces will cause the intangible asset to be 
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especially true in light of the history explaining that the 
deduction for a “reasonable allowance” for compensation 
was intended to allow taxpayers to estimate the amount 
that would or should have been paid by a closely held 
business had salaries been paid to the owners­officers 
through an arms­length negotiation in order to alleviate the 
burden of the Excess Profits Tax.137 
  
retired from service, and they must estimate a reasonable date by 
which this event will occur. 
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 556 (1993) (citing 
BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
INDIVIDUALS ¶ 12.4 (1988)). In cases where Congress has determined what a 
“reasonable allowance” is, it has enacted legislation specifying what constitutes 
reasonable. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 197 (2006) (enacted in response to Newark 
Morning Ledger to provide a fifteen year period for amortizing certain 
intangibles); I.R.C. § 168 (West 2010) (providing specific guidance with respect 
to the methodology for depreciating tangible property); I.R.C. § 195 (West 2010) 
(providing a fifteen year amortization period for start­up expenditures); I.R.C. § 
248 (2006) (providing a 180 month amortization period for corporate 
organizational expenditures); I.R.C. § 709 (2006) (same for partnership 
organizational expenditures). 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 119­24. Professor Griswold also notes:  
Then there are the words “reasonable allowance” for services “actually 
rendered.” These have never quite fitted the Treasury’s recent 
construction of the phrase as a limiting provision. But they are quite 
natural once it is realized that the phrase is an enlarging provision, 
allowing the deduction of amounts although they have not actually 
been paid. For, since there is not an actual payment to determine the 
amount of such a deduction, there must be some limit or measure, and 
this was expressed as a “reasonable allowance,” with the further 
limitation that the allowance could be made only for services “actually 
rendered.” With this new light on the background of the provision, it is 
apparent that it has no bearing on the deduction of salary payments 
actually made, and furnishes no proper basis for the disallowance of 
any deduction. This view is confirmed by the fact that the language was 
not in fact used by the Treasury as a limitation on the deductibility of 
salaries for many years after it was enacted—during all of the period 
when the persons who were familiar with its origin and purpose were 
still in office. 
Griswold, supra note 119, at 290. 
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C. Reasonableness Should Not Be a Limiting Factor in 
Determining Deductibility of Actual Compensation 
Once it is settled that a reasonable allowance for 
compensation refers to an estimated amount, the issue 
remains whether a deduction is allowed for actual 
compensation paid regardless of its reasonableness. The 
answer should be yes. The Code provides a deduction for 
“all” the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred 
during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business.138 
These words are followed by three specific deductions which 
are added to Section 162(a) through the use of the word 
“including.”139 The term “including” is a nonexclusive term 
that is intended to introduce examples.140 The specific 
examples found in Section 162 are illustrative of situations 
that depart from the provision’s general rules and require 
additional explanation. This Article has already discussed 
why a deduction for an estimated amount of compensation 
is different from other deductions for amounts paid.141 The 
paragraph allowing a deduction for traveling expenses 
provides a limitation that such expenses must be incurred 
by a taxpayer “while away from home in the pursuit of a 
  
 138. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006). 
 139. I.R.C. § 162(a). 
 140. See M. DOUGLASS BELLIS, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STATUTORY STRUCTURE 
AND LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING CONVENTIONS: A PRIMER FOR JUDGES (2008), 
which states: 
It has become a convention in federal law that the term “including” 
means what it usually means in English. It is a nonexclusive “for 
instance” type of phrase. If I say I have some change in my pocket, 
including a penny and a dime, most people would expect that I might 
have some other coins as well. Few would think I meant to exclude that 
possibility. But in legal writing in general, there seems a worry that 
“including” means that what follows is a complete list of the elements. 
There are even a few federal laws that use the term “including but not 
limited to.” The “but not limited to” should be thought of as surplusage. 
Id. at 11. In the context of the deduction for a reasonable allowance for 
compensation, see Griswold, supra note 119, at 290, which states that “[t]here is 
first the word ‘including,’ which has never made sense as the introduction to a 
restrictive phrase.” 
 141. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1); see supra Part II.B. 
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trade or business.”142 The third enumerated deduction, the 
deduction for rental payments, is similarly limited—only 
those payments that are for property in which the taxpayer 
does not have or is not taking an equity interest are 
deductible.143 
In other words, to be deductible a business expenses 
must meet the requirements of Section 162(a) and not be 
disallowed or restricted under another provision of the Code 
(including the restrictions and limitations applicable to 
those expenses specifically enumerated in Section 162(a)). 
As discussed previously, capitalized expenditures and 
personal expenses are not deductible.144 Only those expenses 
that are considered customary, ordinary, or usual are 
deductible under Section 162(a).145 Accordingly, the question 
is whether compensation paid by a corporation is 
customary, ordinary, or usual, or whether the deduction for 
such amount is qualified by a reasonable standard.146 
Most commentators would argue that compensation 
must be reasonable to be deductible, and, that while the 
Service has generally applied this standard only to closely 
held corporations, this reasonableness requirement 
similarly could be applied to public corporations.147 This 
  
 142. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2). In addition, as stated previously, the deduction for 
travel expenses allows taxpayers to use an estimated amount in determining 
the size of the deduction. See supra note 135. 
 143. I.R.C. § 162(a)(3). 
 144. See supra text accompanying notes 92­93. 
 145. See Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 188, 195 (1940). 
 146. Compensation that does not satisfy the “ordinary and necessary” 
standard of Section 162(a) should not be deductible. In this vein, compensation 
intended to pay an employee for future services spanning several years would 
not be ordinary and, accordingly, should be capitalized. Similarly, compensation 
paid to provide services not related to a trade or business should be found not to 
be necessary and, therefore, nondeductible. 
 147. Mullane, supra note 87, at 510 n.90 (“Most commentators agree that the 
statutory language of 162(a)(1) would support challenges of executive 
compensation levels, even in public companies.” (citations omitted)); see also 
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax Policy Case for Denying Deductibility to Excessive 
Executive Compensation: Disguised Dividends, Reasonable Compensation, and 
the Protection of the Corporate Income Tax Base, 58 TAX NOTES 1123, 1124 
(1993) (“The code’s restriction on the deductibility of compensation to 
reasonable, i.e., arm’s length, levels literally applies to all corporations; in 
practice, however, the IRS and the courts have invoked section 162(a)(1) only as 
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author believes, however, that the Service has not applied a 
reasonableness standard to determine whether 
compensation is deductible,148 but rather that the Service 
has used a reasonableness criterion to differentiate those 
payments that are deductible business expenses from 
disguised dividend payments made to shareholders in an 
attempt to avoid the imposition of a corporate level tax.149 In 
so doing, the Service generally has correctly limited its 
analysis of the reasonableness of employee compensation to 
payments made to shareholders of closely held corporations. 
This conclusion—that the Service uses a reasonableness 
standard as a mechanism for uncovering nondeductible 
shareholder distributions disguised as deductible 
  
to closely held corporations, and Congress apparently has acquiesced in this 
long­standing application of the reasonable compensation rule.”); Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Reasonable Compensation: A Study in Doctrinal Obsolescence 10 
(Cardozo Law Sch. Working Paper Series No. 31, 2000), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract.id=254928 (“Nothing in the 
statute limits the test of reasonability to closely­held corporations or otherwise 
supports the IRS’s de facto interpretation of Section 162(a)(1) as constraining 
only closely­held corporations.”). But see Bernard Wolfman, Professors and the 
“Ordinary and Necessary” Business Expense, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1089 (1964), 
where Professor Wolfman notes: 
Section 162(a)(1) (“reasonable allowance for salaries”) has been 
thought to provide special warrant for the disallowance as 
“unreasonable” of excessive salary payments. But the fact is—and 
should be recognized and stated—that salary payments are disallowed 
when they are found to be for something other than services, e.g., to 
cover a living or hobby expense of a shareholder­employee or just a 
“salary” so much in excess of competitive requirements that it is 
recognized as a distribution to a shareholder­employee of corporate 
earnings. Literal subservience to a presumed requirement of 
“reasonableness” has led, however, to wholly unjustified disallowance 
in an arm’s­length employer­employee situation . . . and ignores 
legislative history.  
Id. at 1115 n.97 (citations omitted). 
 148. But see Barbara F. Sikon, Note, The Recharacterization of Unreasonable 
Compensation: An Equitable Mandate, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301, 305 (2004). 
(“The purpose of section 162 is to allow employers to deduct salary payments 
that are reasonable. Conversely, deductions for unreasonable salary payments 
must be disallowed.”). 
 149. See id. at 303 (“The deduction limitation of section 162 has been applied 
historically in a manner that illuminates a singular purpose, that is, to unveil 
payments of a noncompensatory nature that have been disguised as 
compensation to create a tax benefit.” (citing Stumpff, supra note 87, at 380)). 
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compensation—is supported by two factors. First, the case 
law surrounding Section 162(a)(1) is replete with cases 
involving payments made by closely held corporations to 
related persons but lacking of cases involving public 
corporations.150 As one commentator notes, it is not 
unnatural for reasonable compensation cases to arise in the 
case of payments between a closely held corporation and 
either a shareholder or a shareholder’s relative: 
compensation is a deductible expense, while neither 
dividends nor gifts are deductible in computing a 
corporation’s taxable income.151 In fact, thousands of cases 
have been decided analyzing the reasonableness of 
compensation in the closely held corporation.152 “Less 
appreciated, however, is the nearly complete absence of 
decisions denying a deduction where a truly arm’s­length 
relationship existed between the employer and employee.”153 
  
 150. See id., where Sikon states: 
The intent of the restriction to reasonableness of section 162, to 
unveil noncompensatory payments disguised as compensation, is 
supported both by 1) the consistency with which section 162 has been 
applied to payments to related parties in closely­held businesses, and 
2) the notable absence of cases involving payments made by large, 
publicly­traded corporations. Although large corporations can make 
excessive salary payments, they are not attacked through section 
162(a) because the character of the payments as compensation is not 
subject to dispute. The excessive payments lack the potential to be 
reclassified as dividends due to the strict uniformity of dividend 
payments made by a publicly­held corporation . . . . Challenges 
through section 162(a) have been reserved for closely held businesses, 
in which the owner can determine both the amounts and the 
characterizations of payments to employees. This attests to the 
function of section 162(a) as a vehicle to scrutinize the proper 
characterization of a transaction. 
Id. at 308. 
 151. Stumpff, supra note 87, at 377. 
 152. Id. (citing Gerald A. Kafka, Reasonable Compensation, 390­2d TAX MGMT. 
PORTFOLIO (BNA), at A­5 (1993)). Stumpff notes that “[t]he ‘reasonable 
compensation’ issue ranks among the most frequently litigated of all tax 
questions.” Id. at 372­73 n.4 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO/GGD­95­232, TAX ADMINISTRATION: RECURRING ISSUES IN TAX DISPUTES 
OVER BUSINESS EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS 15­17 (1995)). 
 153. Id. at 377­78 (emphasis omitted).  Stumpff cites only a single case in 
which a payment by a corporation to a person unrelated to a corporation’s 
shareholders was recharacterized as other than compensation. Id. at 377­78 
(citing Patton v. Comm’r, 168 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1948)). While the facts of Patton 
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This author has found no cases in which the Service has 
successfully challenged the reasonableness of compensation 
paid by a public company.154 
  
do not indicate an attempt by the shareholders to recharacterize a 
nondeductible amount into compensation, Stumpff states that “[e]ven in Patton 
 . . . the relationship among the parties was likely something less than 
completely arm’s­length.” Id. at 378 (citing Kafka, supra note 152, at A­5); see 
also Sikon, supra note 148, at 308 (“In Patton, the party to whom unreasonable 
payments were made was neither an owner nor a relative of an owner, but 
rather an elderly, favored employee. Although he was not a related party in the 
sense of actual family, a strong personal relationship that evolved over many 
years of employment made the transaction less than arms’ length.”). In Patton, 
the dissent analyzed the history of the Service’s inquiry into the reasonableness 
of compensation paid by a corporation noting that, where a deduction was 
disallowed: 
In all of these cases, the amounts were paid to officers who were 
really the beneficial owners of the corporation and who controlled its 
action in contracting for and paying them the unusually high salaries 
based upon net profits. The reasons the courts have held such salaries 
were not deductible as “ordinary and necessary expenses,” were 
because they were not, in fact, compensation . . . but profits diverted to 
stock holding officers under the guise of salaries; and that a 
distribution of profits “under the guise of salaries” to officers who held 
the stock of a company and controlled its affairs, is not an ordinary 
and necessary expense, within the meaning of the statute . . . .  
. . . As was said in United States v. Philadelphia Knitting Mills Co., 
supra, the Government has no right to inquire into and determine 
whether the amount of the salary was proper, or whether it was too 
much or too little, but only “whether the amount paid is salary or 
something else.” 
Patton, 168 F.2d at 33 (quoting United States v. Phila. Knitting Mills Co, 273 F. 
657, 658 (3d Cir. 1921) (McAllister, J., dissenting)). 
 154. Professor Stabile provides four cases in which the Service challenged the 
reasonableness of compensation paid by a public corporation. See Stabile, supra 
note 24, at 85 & n.14. In two of these cases, the compensation paid was found to 
be reasonable and the taxpayer was allowed the deduction. See Brown­Forman 
Distillers Corp. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 711 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Pfeifer 
Brewing Co. v. Comm’r, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 586 (1952). The third case, R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 889 (Ct. Cl. 1957), aff’d, 260 
F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1958), was “not so much an issue of excessive compensation as it 
was a claim that the method for allocating stock under a bonus arrangement 
made the stock distribution more like a dividend than a compensation 
payment.” Stabile, supra note 24, at 85 n.14 (citing R.J. Reynolds, 149 F. Supp. 
at 12). The final case, Patton, “involved a suspicion that the employer and not 
the employee actually kept the compensation.” Stabile, supra note 24, at 85 n.14 
(citing Patton, 168 F.2d at 29). For a discussion of Patton, see supra note 153. 
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Second, the Service has attempted to apply a 
reasonableness standard to compensation paid by S 
corporations only in situations where an adjustment to the 
amount treated as compensation would result in a tax 
adjustment.155 Since a taxpayer that is both the owner and 
an employee of an S corporation can receive corporate 
distributions either in the form of salary or dividend 
distributions, taxpayer gamesmanship in characterizing 
payments as either the former or the latter can result in the 
shareholder­employee receiving the same economics at the 
expense of the fisc. In this context, the Service has 
challenged the reasonableness of compensation in two 
circumstances:  first, in situations where the compensation 
was unreasonably high; second, in situations where the 
compensation is unreasonably low.156 
With respect to excessive compensation, the Service had 
challenged the reasonableness of compensatory payments in 
  
But see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7735027 (May 31, 1977), where, without reaching a 
conclusion on the question of fact, the Service noted that Section 162(a)(1) 
allows a deduction for compensation that is reasonable in amount and for 
services actually rendered. Id. The taxpayer at issue in the private letter ruling 
was a publicly traded corporation. Id. However, even in such situation, the facts 
indicate that the compensation arrangement was connected to a potential 
repurchase of the stock of the corporate executives. Id. The Service concluded 
the ruling by stating that,  
[I]t is held that the payments made by M to A and B in accordance with 
the agreements described above are deductible by M as compensation 
under section 162 of the Code to the extent that such payments when 
added to all other compensation paid by M to A and B, are reasonable 
in amount and for services actually rendered by A and B to M. The 
question of whether such payments are, in fact, reasonable in amount 
and for services actually rendered, rather than for the stock of N, which 
A and B agreed to sell to M are questions of fact to be determined upon 
audit by the appropriate office of the District Director. 
Id. 
 155. See Sikon, supra note 148, which states: 
The incidence of section 162 challenges to subchapter S corporation 
payments are relatively infrequent and limited to special situations in 
which there is a potential tax increase accompanying an adjustment.  
. . . That is, due to the lack of inherent double taxation applicable to C 
corporation dividends, an S corporation owner has no tax avoidance 
purpose to achieve by overcompensating himself or other owners. 
Id. at 308­09 (footnote omitted). 
 156. Id. at 310. 
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situations in which the payment of excessive compensation 
would have resulted in tax avoidance as a result of the 
difference in tax rates for earned and unearned income of S 
corporation shareholders.157 Between 1971 and 1981, Section 
1348 provided for a maximum marginal tax rate of fifty 
percent on earned income at a time when the highest 
marginal rate on unearned income was seventy percent.158 
During that period, the Service challenged the 
reasonableness of compensation to determine whether the 
owners of S corporations were paying excessive 
compensation in an attempt to convert unearned income 
into earned income.159 
Below­market compensation, on the other hand, allows 
a shareholder­employee to avoid payroll tax liabilities.160 In 
  
 157. Id. 
 158. Section 1348 was added to the Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. 
L. 91­172, § 804(a), 83 Stat. 487, 685 (effective for tax years beginning December 
31, 1970).  Section 1348 was repealed effective for tax years beginning after 
December 31, 1981.  See Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97­34, § 
101(c)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 183. 
 159. See, for example, RTS Investment Corp. v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 647 
(8th Cir. 1989), where in upholding the lower court’s determination that salaries 
paid to a corporation’s shareholders were not reasonable in amount, the court 
stated that “the burden of proving reasonableness of compensation is on the 
taxpayer and ‘close scrutiny’ is required of salary arrangements between a 
corporation and its shareholders.” Id. at 650 (citations omitted). See also Hilt v. 
Comm’r, 899 F.2d 1225, No. 88­7331, 1990 WL 42264 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(unpublished table decision); Chi. Stadium Corp. v. United States, No. 88 C 
3706, 1991 WL 185227, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 1991) (“[T]he payment must be 
made for services rendered to the corporate employer and not for something 
else—whether a dividend distribution or anything else—in disguise.”). For cases 
upholding the taxpayer’s determination of a reasonable amount of 
compensation, see Trucks, Inc. v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 638, 642 (D. Neb. 
1984), aff’d, 763 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[C]ompensation paid to employee­
shareholders by closely held corporations are subject to careful scrutiny in order 
to insure that what is really a distribution of dividends may not be passed off as 
a payment of compensation.”); Wigutow v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (P­H) ¶ 83,620  
(1983); Schiff v. Comm’r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 659 (1980) (“Where officer­
shareholders, who are in control of a corporation, set their own compensation, 
careful scrutiny is required to determine whether the alleged compensation is in 
fact a distribution of profits.”). 
 160. See I.R.C. § 3111 (2006) (subjecting wages, but not dividends, to the 
Social Security and Medicare excise taxes). See also Construction & Design Co. 
v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 563 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 
2009), in which the court notes that: 
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those cases, the Service has attempted to recharacterize 
dividends paid by an S corporation as compensation subject 
to payroll taxes.161 For example, in Radtke v. United States, 
the court held that a lawyer who worked full­time for his 
wholly owned professional S corporation and drew no salary 
would be subject to employment taxes on dividends 
withdrawn from the corporation.162 In analyzing the case 
before it, the court noted that it was obligated “to look at the 
substance, not the form, of the transactions at issue[,]”163 
and that, determining whether dividends could be 
recharacterized as wages where the amount of wages paid 
were unreasonably low, “is simply the flip side of those 
instances in which corporations attempt to disguise profit 
distributions as salaries for whatever tax benefits that may 
produce.”164 
  
The distinction between accounting profits, losses, assets, and 
liabilities, on the one hand and cash flow on the other is especially 
important when one is dealing with either a firm undergoing 
reorganization in bankruptcy or a small privately held firm; in the 
latter case, in order to avoid double taxation (corporate income tax 
plus personal income tax on dividends), the company might try to 
make its profits disappear into officers’ salaries. See Menard, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 560 F.3d 620, 621 (7th Cir. 2009). The owners of a 
Subchapter S corporation, however, have the opposite incentive—to 
alchemize salary into earnings. A corporation has to pay employment 
taxes, such as state unemployment insurance tax and social security 
tax, on the salaries it pays. A Subchapter S corporation can avoid 
paying them by recharacterizing salary as a distribution of corporation 
income. 
Id. at 595­96. This issue plagued John Edwards during the 2004 presidential 
campaign. See Laura Saunders, The Unforeseen Risks of Underplaying Your 
Income, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2011, at B9.   
 161. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74­44, 1974­1 C.B. 287. 
 162. 712 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Wis. 1989), aff’d per curiam, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th 
Cir. 1990). 
 163. Id. at 145 (citing Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 
(1978)). 
 164. Id. at 146 (citing Miles­Conley Co. v. Comm’r, 173 F.2d 958, 960­61 (4th 
Cir. 1949)). See also David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 714 F. Supp. 2d 954 
(S.D. Iowa 2010), which cites cases dealing with the substance over form 
doctrine to analyze whether dividends paid by an S corporation to its sole 
shareholder who was also an employee constituted compensation subject to 
employment tax. Id. at 963­64. The court denied the taxpayer’s motion for 
summary judgment. Id. at 966.  The court later held that the Service’s 
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As these S corporation cases show, the Service’s concern 
is not with the level of compensation paid to an S 
corporation shareholder, but, rather, whether an employee­
shareholder is using the corporate form and the labels 
surrounding the payment (i.e., as compensation or corporate 
distribution) in order to avoid the incurrence of taxation. 
III. CURRENT TAX PROVISIONS THAT ATTEMPT TO REGULATE 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION  
Currently, four different Code provisions act to limit 
executive compensation. First, unless certain exceptions 
apply, Section 162(m) prevents publicly traded corporations 
from deducting compensation paid to certain corporate 
officers in excess of $1 million.165 Second, Sections 280G and 
4999 operate in tandem in an attempt to penalize publicly 
traded corporations that pay golden parachute payments 
and the employees that receive such payments.166 Finally, 
Section 409A provides rules governing the tax treatment of 
nonqualified deferred compensation.167 More specifically, 
under Section 409A, unless certain requirements are 
satisfied, amounts deferred under a nonqualified deferred 
compensation plan are currently includible in income to the 
extent not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.168 
Section 409A merely imposes timing rules, and has no 
impact on the amount of compensation the employer can 
pay or deduct.169 Because Section 409A neither limits itself 
to the compensation paid by publicly traded corporations, 
nor effects the amount or deductibility of such 
compensation, this Part focuses on Sections 162(m), 280G, 
and 4999.  
  
recharacterization of dividend and loan payments to the taxpayer as wages was 
reasonable. See id. at 963. 
 165. I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2010). See infra Part III.A. 
 166. I.R.C. § 280G (West 2010); I.R.C. § 4999 (2006). See infra Part III.B. 
 167. I.R.C. § 409A (2006). 
 168. I.R.C. § 409A(a). 
 169. See William A. Drennan, The Pirates Will Party On! The Nonqualified 
Deferred Compensation Rules Will Not Prevent CEOs From Acting Like 
Plundering Pirates and Should Be Scuttled, 33 VT. L. REV. 1, 27 (2008). 
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A. Section 162(m) 
In 1993, Congress enacted Section 162(m) in an attempt 
to deal with the perceived problem of excessive executive 
compensation.170 Executive compensation was of significant 
interest to the media during the early 1990s, and, in 
particular, during the 1992 presidential campaign.171 The 
legislative history states that Section 162(m) was motivated 
by concerns regarding the amount of executive 
compensation paid by public companies, and that the 
provision was intended to reduce excessive compensation.172 
According to a House report, “the amount of compensation 
received by corporate executives has been the subject of 
scrutiny and criticism.”173 Congress determined that 
“excessive compensation will be reduced if the deduction for 
compensation (other than performance­based compensation) 
paid to the top executives of publicly held corporations is 
limited to $1 million per year.”174 
  
 170. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103­66, § 
13211(a), 107 Stat. 312, 469­71; see also Conway, supra note 24, at 396. 
 171. See Conway, supra note 24, at 396; Kevin J. Ryan, Rethinking Section 
162(m)’s Limitation on the Deduction of Executive Compensation: A Review of 
the Commentary, 15 VA. TAX REV. 371, 371 (1995); Kenneth R. Ferris & James 
S. Wallace, I.R.C. Section 162(m) and the Law of Unintended Consequences 
(Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=942667. During the 1992 presidential campaign, then­Governor Bill 
Clinton stated that “[i]t’s wrong for executives to do what so many did in the 
1980s. The biggest companies raised their [executives’] pay four times the 
percentage their workers’ pay went up and three times the percentage their 
profits went up.” The Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Presidential Candidates Divide on 
Executive Compensation Caps, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 42, 1634 (1992). 
 172. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND 
BACKGROUND RELATING TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 6 (Comm. Print 2006) 
[hereinafter 2006 JCT EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REPORT] (citing H.R. REP. 
NO. 103­111, at 646 (1993)); see also Camelia M. Kuhnen & Alexandra Niessen, 
Is Executive Compensation Shaped by Public Attitudes? (Oct. 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1328572 
(providing preliminary evidence that the increased negativity and media 
coverage of CEO pay between 1990 and 1992 led to the passage of Section 
162(m)). 
 173. H.R. REP. NO. 103­111, at 646.  
 174.  Id. The Conference Committee Report specifically states that Section 
162(m) was not intended to “modify the present­law requirement that in order 
to be deductible compensation must be reasonable.”  H.R. REP. NO. 103­213, at 
584 n.44 (1993) (Conf. Rep.). The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has 
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Section 162(m) denies a deduction for applicable 
employee remuneration175 paid or accrued with respect to a 
covered employee of a publicly held corporation176 in excess 
of $1 million.177 A covered employee is defined by reference 
to SEC rules governing disclosure of executive 
compensation.178 The Code defines a “covered employee” as 
  
noted that “[w]hile in theory the reasonableness requirement could act as a limit 
on total compensation paid, this requirement has been applied primarily to 
prevent dividends of closely­held companies (which are not deductible) from 
being characterized as compensation (which is deductible).” 2006 JCT 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REPORT, supra note 172, at 6. 
 175. Unless specifically excluded, Section 162(m) applies to all remuneration 
for services, including cash and the cash value of all remuneration (including 
benefits) paid in a medium other than cash. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 
107TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 27 (Comm. Print 2002). Compensation not subject to the 
deduction limit, and not taken into account in determining whether other 
compensation exceeds $1 million, includes: (i) remuneration payable on a 
commission basis; (ii) remuneration payable solely on account of the attainment 
of one or more performance goals if certain independent director and 
shareholder approval requirements are met; (iii) payments to a tax­qualified 
retirement plan (including salary reduction contributions); (iv) amounts 
excludable from the executive’s gross income (such as employer­provided health 
benefits, group­term life insurance and miscellaneous fringe benefits); and (v) 
compensation payable under a written binding contract in effect as of February 
17, 1993 (provided that such contract was not materially modified prior to the 
payment of the compensation). See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4) (West 2010). In addition, 
Section 162(m) does not apply to certain amounts paid by a corporation that was 
not a publicly held corporation and then becomes a publicly held corporation. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.162­27(f)(1) (as amended in 1996).  
 176. For these purposes, a corporation is treated as publicly held if the 
corporation has a class of common equity securities that is required to be 
registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. I.R.C. § 
162(m)(2); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.162­27(c)(1) (providing that (i) voluntary 
registration of securities does not cause a corporation to be publicly held; and (ii) 
for purposes of Section 162(m), whether a corporation is publicly held is 
determined based solely on whether the corporation is subject to the reporting 
obligations of section 12 of the Exchange Act as of the last day of its taxable 
year). 
 177. I.R.C. § 162(m)(1). The $1 million limitation is reduced to $500,000 with 
respect to certain employees of certain employers that received TARP funds. See 
I.R.C. § 162(m)(5), as added by Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 
P.L. 110­343, § 302(a), 122 Stat. 3765, 3803­06. See supra note 83. 
 178. I.R.C. § 162(m)(3). Treasury Regulation Section 1.162­27(c)(2)(ii) provides 
that whether an individual is a covered employee for purposes of Section 162(m) 
is to be determined in accordance with the executive compensation disclosure 
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an employee of a corporation if such person is either (i) the 
chief executive officer of the corporation (or an individual 
acting in such capacity) at the end of such year, or (ii) an 
employee whose total compensation for such year is 
required to be reported because the employee is one of the 
four highest compensated officers for the taxable year (other 
than the chief executive officer).179 However, as a result of 
amendments to the SEC disclosure rules, effective after 
December 15, 2006, the Service has administratively refined 
such definition.180 
  
rules of the Exchange Act. In accordance with such regulation, an individual is a 
covered employee only if he or she is employed as of the last day of the 
employer’s taxable year. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162­27(c)(2)(i). The Service has 
concluded that an officer who resigns his or her position as an officer and 
employee prior to the last day of the tax year will not be considered a covered 
employee for such year even if, under SEC executive compensation rules, such 
person is required to be listed in the corporation’s proxy and continues to 
perform services for the corporation as an independent consultant and/or 
director, and receive compensation from deferred bonuses, stock options, and 
annual income from consulting contracts unless such person intends to resume 
his or her responsibilities as a corporate officer in the foreseeable future. I.R.S. 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199928014 (Apr. 13, 1999). 
 179. I.R.C. § 162(m)(3).  
 180. The SEC’s rules relating to executive compensation disclosure under the 
Exchange Act are contained in Item 402 of Regulation S­K. 17 C.F.R. 229.402 
(2010). Under the disclosure rules in effect at the time Section 162(m) was 
enacted, and for fiscal years ending prior to December 15, 2006, named 
executive officers consisted of (i) all individuals serving as a corporation’s chief 
executive officer (or acting in a similar capacity) during the last completed fiscal 
year regardless of compensation level, and (ii) the corporation’s four most highly 
compensated executive officers (other than the CEO) who were serving as 
executive officers at the end of the last completed fiscal year. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.402 (2005). A final rule amending the SEC executive compensation 
disclosure rules altered the composition of the group of executives that are 
covered by Item 402. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2010), amended by Executive 
Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 
2006). As amended, Item 402 provides that the named executive officers consist 
of (i) all individuals serving as the corporation’s principal executive officer (or 
acting in a similar capacity) during the last completed fiscal year (“PEO”) 
regardless of compensation level, (ii) all individuals serving as the corporation’s 
principal financial officer (or acting in a similar capacity) during the last 
completed fiscal year (“PFO”) regardless of compensation level, and (iii) the 
corporation’s three most highly compensated executive officers other than the 
PEO and PFO who were serving as executive officers at the end of the last 
completed fiscal year. Id. As a result of the change in the SEC disclosure rules, 
the Service determined that it needed to issue guidance under Section 162(m). 
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In an attempt to tie executive pay to corporate 
performance, Congress exempted from Section 162(m) any 
performance­based compensation that satisfied three 
conditions.181 First, the performance goals are determined by 
a compensation committee comprised solely of two or more 
outside directors of the corporation.182 Second, the material 
terms of the performance­based pay, including the goals 
established, are disclosed to shareholders and approved by a 
majority of shareholders in a separate vote before the 
compensation is paid.183 Third, prior to payment, the 
compensation committee provides written certification that 
the performance goals and any other material terms were 
satisfied.184 
Two things happened in reaction to Section 162(m).185 
First, some corporations changed their method for 
compensating corporate executives, and performance­based 
pay (i.e., stock options) became the primary form of 
executive compensation for many corporations.186 Second, 
some corporations ignored Section 162(m)—continuing to 
pay compensation above the $1 million limitation in spite of 
  
See I.R.S. Notice 2007­49, 2007­1 C.B. 1429. In Notice 2007­49, the Service 
concluded that for purposes of Section 162(m), the term “covered employee” 
includes any employee of a corporation if, at the close of the taxable year, such 
employee is either the PEO or an individual acting in such capacity, or if such 
employee’s total compensation for that taxable year must be reported to 
shareholders under the Exchange Act as being among the three highest 
compensated officers other than the PEO or PFO for that taxable year. Id. The 
term “covered employee” does not include a corporation’s PFO (or an individual 
acting in such capacity). Id. 
 181. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.162­27(e) (as amended in 
1995). According to the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, “[w]hile not 
specifically mentioned in the legislative history, the exception to the limitation 
for performance­based compensation reflects the view that such compensation, 
by its nature, is not ‘excessive.’” 2006 JCT EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REPORT, 
supra note 172, at 6. 
 182. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(i). 
 183. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(ii). 
 184. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(iii). 
 185. See Conway, supra note 24, at 396. 
 186. Id. 
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the loss of a tax deduction.187 Corporate shareholders bear 
the costs of these corporate actions.188 
Numerous commentators have noted that Section 
162(m) has had the unintended consequence of increasing 
executive compensation at publicly held corporations.189 
Professor Kathryn Kennedy notes that, rather than 
discouraging excessive compensation: 
The congressionally mandated $1 million limit on executive salary 
became the industry standard. Suddenly all top executives and 
key employees expected companies to offer a base salary of one   
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. See also Mullane, supra note 87, at 493 (asserting that the burden of 
Congress’ efforts to limit executive compensation through the tax code falls on 
“rank­and­file Americans” to a substantial extent). 
 189. See, e.g., Conway, supra note 24, at 396. Additionally, see Gary Shorter et 
al., Excessive CEO Pay: Background and Policy Approaches, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RS22604 at 5 (Nov. 29, 2007), available at http://opencrs.com/ 
document/RS22604/2007­11­29/, where the authors state: 
P.L. 103­66 established code section 162 (m) . . . which imposes a $1 
million cap that applies to the CEO and the four next­highest­paid 
officers. No tax deduction for compensation above the $1 million limit is 
permitted, except for “performance­based” pay, such as commissions or 
stock options, where the ultimate compensation received by the 
executive depends on the stock price, reported sales or profits, or some 
other financial indicator. The OBRA provision is widely believed to 
have contributed to the increased use of stock options in CEO 
compensation in the mid­ and late 1990s. To the extent that this is 
true, OBRA may have had the unintended consequence of increasing 
CEO pay. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive 
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 926 (2007) 
(“The empirical evidence suggests that § 162(m) has had unintended 
consequences. Executive compensation has increased, while a large number of 
firms are apparently forfeiting valuable tax deductions. Both of these results are 
contrary to the intent of Congress.”); Stabile, supra note 24, at 82 n.5 (“One 
reason for the large increase in executive compensation over the last decade is 
the move toward performance­based compensation, particularly stock options, 
which have generated huge returns over the last decade.” (citations omitted)); 
Stephen M. Salley, Note, “Fixing” Executive Compensation: Will Congress, 
Shareholder Activism, or the New SEC Disclosure Rules Change the Way 
Business is Done in American Boardrooms?, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 757, 763 (2009) 
(“Most commentators have noted that § 162(m) is a classic example of the law of 
unintended consequences, because the amendments, designed to reduce 
compensation, have actually resulted in higher pay packages as a result of 
bonuses and stock options.”). 
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million dollars in addition to generous stock options and 
retirement benefits. The new base salary was expected regardless 
of industry, effect, company development, or shareholder 
concerns. The perception existed that boards of directors conceded 
to the new base salary because the compensation packages were 
completely deductible.190 
Professor Kennedy also notes that the focus on 
performance­based compensation resulting from Section 
162(m) provides corporate executives with an incentive to 
focus on short­term performance.191 According to Professor 
Kennedy: 
[I]nstead of focusing on long­term objectives, executives 
concentrated on quarterly performance. By meeting Wall Street’s 
performance expectations, the stock price increased at a faster 
pace, generating more short­term profit for executives upon each 
stock sale. Unless the stock option program required a vesting 
period of several years, executives could, and did, exercise their 
options earlier. In addition, some boards of directors fueled the 
problem by awarding executives large amounts of option awards, 
allowing executives to sell stock, re­pricing poor performing stock 
options in order to prevent executives from leaving, and back 
dating stock options. The perception was that reliance on the use 
of options encouraged executives to ignore the long­term effect of 
current strategy in favor of their short­term financial interests, 
which increased the risk of dilution for non­employee 
shareholders.192 
A related consequence of Section 162(m) is that it 
provides corporate executives with an incentive to 
manipulate corporate performance to maximize their own 
personal wealth.193 Famous securities class­action lawyer 
William Lerach described the system created by Section 
162(m) as follows: 
  
 190. Kathryn J. Kennedy, Excessive Executive Compensation: Prior Federal 
Attempts to Curb Perceived Abuses, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 196, 220 (2010) 
(citing John A. Byrne, That’s Some Pay Cap, Bill, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 25, 1994, 
at 57, available at http://www.businessweek.com/archives/1994/b336854. 
arc.htm). 
 191. See id. (citing Lee E. Sheppard, Big Paydays Are Back!, 124 TAX NOTES 99 
(2009)). 
 192. Id. at 221. 
 193. Martin D. Mobley, Compensation Committee Reports Post­Sarbanes 
Oxley: Unimproved Disclosure of Executive Compensation Policies and Practices, 
1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 111, 123 (2005). 
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[W]hether driven by greed or envy—or perhaps both—it is clear 
now that an increasingly lavish—crazy—stock­option 
compensation system incentivized corporate executives to do 
whatever—and I mean whatever—had to be done to meet earnings 
expectations, so that they could achieve corporate earnings targets 
to trigger their performance bonuses and boost the stock price so 
that their stock options could be exercised and they could sell 
stock at high prices.194  
It is not just commentators that are critical of Section 
162(m). The same government that enacted this provision in 
1993 is now critical of the consequences caused by its 
passage. For example, Christopher Cox, the former 
chairman of the SEC and Congressman, stated before 
Congress: 
[O]ne of the most significant reasons that non­salary forms of 
compensation have ballooned since the early 1990s is the $1 
million legislative cap on salaries for certain top public company 
executives that was added to the Internal Revenue Code in 1993. 
As a Member of Congress at the time, I well remember that the 
stated purpose was to control the rate of growth in CEO pay. With 
complete hindsight, we can now all agree that this purpose was 
not achieved. Indeed, this tax law change deserves pride of place 
in the Museum of Unintended Consequences.195 
Many corporations, concluding that compliance with 
Section 162(m) would interfere with their business 
judgment, have decided that it is in their best long­term 
interests to pay compensation that is not deductible.196 In   
 194. William Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got Taken 
for Trillions by Corporate Insiders, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 69, 96 (2002) 
(footnote omitted). 
 195. Stock Options Backdating: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Rep. Christopher 
Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n), available at http://www.sec.gov 
/news/testimony/2006/ts090606cc.htm (speaking about SEC disclosure rules 
regarding executive compensation). The Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation has noted that a number of studies also support the fact that Section 
162(m) has not reduced the growth in executive compensation. See 2006 JCT 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REPORT, supra note 172, at 7 (citations omitted). 
 196. See Conway, supra note 24, at 405 (citing Steven Balsam & Qin Jennifer 
Yin, Explaining Firm Willingness to Forfeit Tax Deductions Under Internal 
Revenue Code Section 162(m): The Million­Dollar Cap, 24 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 
300, 321 (2005) (finding that almost forty percent of affected corporations 
forfeited deductions rather than comply with the $1 million cap)); see also 
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these cases, Section 162(m) acts to increase the cost of 
executive compensation.197 
The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, in a 
review of the Enron Corporation and its related entities 
following the Enron bankruptcy,198 concluded that “[t]he $1 
  
Polsky, supra note 189, at 926 (“The empirical evidence suggests that § 162(m) 
has had unintended consequences. Executive compensation has increased, while 
a large number of firms are apparently forfeiting valuable tax deductions. Both 
of these results are contrary to the intent of Congress.”). As an illustration of the 
ineffectiveness of Section 162(m), note the disclosure found in the 2009 Proxy 
Statement for Oracle Compensation: 
In evaluating potential compensation alternatives, our 
Compensation Committee considers the possible impact of 
Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the 
“Code”). Section 162(m) of the Code places a limit of $1 million on the 
amount of compensation that we may deduct as a business expense in 
any year with respect to certain of our most highly paid executives 
unless, among other things, such compensation is performance based 
and has been approved by stockholders. We therefore design our 
executive compensation program, including our annual performance 
cash bonus plan and our stock option grants, to be eligible for 
deductibility to the extent permitted by the relevant tax regulations, 
including Section 162(m) of the Code. However, we may from time to 
time pay compensation to our senior executives that may not be 
deductible if there are non­tax reasons for doing so. 
ORACLE CORP. 2009 PROXY STATEMENT 36 (2010) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/investor­relations/proxy/orcl­2010­proxy­
170698.pdf. Notwithstanding the fact that all of Oracle’s 2009 compensation 
qualified for a deduction under Section 162, Larry Ellison earned approximately 
$130 million that year.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 197. See Conway, supra note 24, at 405­06. 
  198. In February 2002, Senator Max Baucus and Senator Charles E. Grassley 
of the Senate Finance Committee directed the staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation to review the Enron Corporation and related entities: 
The review focused on two principal areas: (1) Enron’s use of tax shelter 
arrangements, offshore entities, and special purpose entities, and (2) 
the compensation arrangements of Enron employees, including tax­
qualified retirement plans, nonqualified deferred compensation 
arrangements, and other arrangements, in order to analyze the factors 
that may have contributed to the loss of benefits and the extent to 
which losses were experienced by different groups of employees. 
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REP. OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON 
CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND 
COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (Comm. Print 2003) 
[hereinafter JCT ENRON REPORT]. 
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million deduction limitation was designed to address 
corporate governance concerns that top executives were 
receiving excessive compensation. The experience with 
Enron indicates that the limitation is not effective in 
achieving its purposes. Taxpayers may choose to pay 
nondeductible compensation, and accept the potential 
adverse tax consequences.”199 
The Joint Committee recommended that Section 162(m) 
be repealed and that laws other than the tax code be used to 
address excessive compensation issues.200 
B. Sections 280(g) and 4999 
Section 162(m) was not Congress’ first attempt at 
defining reasonable compensation in the public company 
context. Ten years earlier, in 1984, Congress attempted to 
limit golden parachute arrangements made by public 
corporations to key executives.201 According to Congress, 
such arrangements were designed to dissuade interested 
buyers from pursuing an acquisition, drive up the cost of 
corporate acquisitions, or encourage corporate executives 
  
 199. Id. at 43. For 1998 through 2000, $48.5 million, or eleven percent of total 
compensation paid by Enron to its management, was nondeductible under 
Section 162(m). Id. at 42­43. 
 200. Id. at 43. 
 201. One commentator describes “golden parachute agreements” as follows: 
In response to increasing corporate mergers and acquisitions, target 
corporations have developed defensive tactics designed to discourage 
both tender offers and successful takeovers by aggressor corporations. 
One defensive tactic, increasingly popular with corporate 
management, is the “golden parachute” agreement. Golden parachute 
agreements provide for lucrative payments to key executives in the 
event of change in corporate ownership or control. Theoretically, the 
cost of these payments increases overall takeover costs and thereby 
discourages takeover attempts. 
Dana M. Leonard, Golden Parachutes and Draconian Measures Aimed at 
Control: Is Internal Revenue Code Section 280G the Proper Regulatory Mode of 
Shareholder Protection?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1293, 1293 (1986) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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with parachute arrangement to pursue acquisitions not in 
the best interests of their shareholders.202 
As part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Congress 
enacted Sections 280G and 4999 to “discourage transactions 
which tended to reduce amounts which might otherwise be 
paid to target corporation shareholders.”203 Section 280G 
restricts the ability of a corporation to deduct excess 
parachute payments, while Section 4999 imposes an excise 
tax of twenty percent on recipients of such amounts.204 
For these purposes, a “parachute payment” is any 
payment in the nature of compensation (including payments 
to be made under a covenant not to compete or similar 
arrangement) that meets three requirements. First, the 
payment is made to (or for the benefit of) a disqualified 
individual.205 Second, such payment is contingent on a 
  
 202. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION 
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 199­200 
(Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter 1984 JCT REPORT]. 
 203. Id. at 201; see I.R.C. § 280G(a) (West 2010); I.R.C. § 4999(a) (2006); see 
also Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98­369, 98 Stat. 464. Congress 
believed that:  
In almost any takeover situation, be it hostile or friendly, the 
acquiring company in theory will pay a maximum amount and no 
more. To the extent some of that amount, directly or indirectly, must 
be paid to executives and other key personnel of the target corporation, 
because of the existence of golden parachutes or similar arrangements, 
there is less for the shareholders of that corporation. Congress decided 
to discourage transactions which tended to reduce amounts which 
might otherwise be paid to target corporation shareholders. 
1984 JCT REPORT, supra note 202, at 201; see also Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden 
Parachute Provisions: Time for Repeal?, 21 VA. TAX REV. 125, 126 (2001); Jamie 
Dietrich Hankinson, Comment, Golden Parachute Tax Provisions Fall Flat: Tax 
Gross­ups Soften Their Impact to Executives and Square D Overinflates Their 
Coverage, 34 STETSON L. REV. 767, 770 (2005). 
 204. See I.R.C. § 280G; I.R.C. § 4999; see also 1984 JCT REPORT, supra note 
202, at 200. The twenty percent excise tax imposed by Section 4999 is in 
addition to the regular income and Social Security taxes imposed on the 
payment. See I.R.C. §§ 4999(a), (c)(1). 
 205. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A). Hankinson notes that, 
The phrase “golden parachute payment” has a different meaning in 
common business usage than in a tax context. As commonly used, the 
term refers to large severance payments made when an executive’s 
employment is terminated following a corporate acquisition. However, 
for federal income tax purposes, the phrase, “golden parachute 
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change in the ownership or effective control of a corporation, 
or in the ownership of a substantial portion of its assets.206 
Third, the aggregate present value of all such payments 
made or to be made to the disqualified individual equals or 
exceeds three times the disqualified individual’s base 
amount.207 In addition, a parachute payment includes “any 
payment in the nature of compensation to (or for the benefit 
of) a disqualified individual if such payment is made 
pursuant to any agreement that violates any generally 
enforced securities laws or regulations.”208 Sections 280G 
and 4999 generally are limited to public corporations.209 
A disqualified individual is any employee, independent 
contractor, or other person (specified in Treasury 
Regulations) who performs personal services for the 
corporation and who is an officer, shareholder, or highly 
compensated individual of the corporation.210 A highly 
compensated individual is an individual who is (or would be 
if the individual were an employee) among the highest paid 
one percent of the employees (or, if less, among the 250 
highest paid employees) of the corporation.211 
  
payment,” has a definition that is keyed to a change in corporate 
control and is not limited to severance or other termination payments, 
but instead applies to any payment of compensation. 
Hankinson, supra note 203, at 773. 
 206. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A)(i). But see 2006 JCT EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
REPORT, supra note 172, at 44 (stating, incorrectly, that “[i]n some cases, the 
compensation agreement for a corporate executive may provide for payments to 
be made if the executive loses his or her job as a result of a change in control of 
the company. Such payments are referred to as ‘golden parachute payments’”). 
 207. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A)(ii). An individual’s base amount is the average 
annual compensation includible in the individual’s gross income over the five 
taxable years of such individual preceding the individual’s taxable year in which 
the change in ownership or control occurs. If the individual did not perform 
services for the corporation throughout that entire five­year period, the relevant 
period is that portion of the five­year period in which he or she did perform 
services for the corporation (with compensation for any portion of a taxable year 
being annualized before an average is determined). I.R.C. § 280G(b)(3); 1984 
JCT REPORT, supra note 202, at 200. 
 208. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(B). 
 209. See I.R.C. § 280G(b)(5).  
 210. I.R.C. § 280G(c). Personal service corporations and similar entities are 
generally treated as individuals for this purpose. I.R.C. § 280G(c). 
 211. I.R.C. § 280G(c). 
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Under Section 280G, a corporation will be denied a tax 
deduction only for the portion of a parachute payment that 
qualifies as an excess parachute payment.212 Section 280G 
defines excess parachute payment as the amount by which 
the parachute payment exceeds the individual’s base 
amount.213 However, the portion of the payment that the 
corporation establishes by clear and convincing evidence is 
reasonable compensation for personal services actually 
rendered before the change in control will reduce the 
amount treated as an excess parachute payment.214 The 
legislative history to Sections 280G and 4999 suggests that 
such a reduction will only occur in rare circumstances: 
The Congress believed that in most large, publicly­held 
corporations, top executives are not under­compensated. 
Accordingly, the Congress contemplated that only in rare cases, if 
any, will any portion of a parachute payment be treated as 
reasonable compensation in response to an argument that a 
disqualified individual with respect to such a corporation was 
under­compensated for periods prior to the change in ownership 
or control.215 
These provisions, however, have not accomplished 
Congress’ stated goals at the time of enactment.216 “In 
practice, corporations continue to make these payments, 
  
 212. I.R.C. § 280G(a). 
 213. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(1). 
 214. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(4). 
 215. 1984 JCT REPORT, supra note 202, at 204. The Conference Report gives 
the following examples of reasonable compensation: 
(1) payments in cancellation of a normal stock option, or normal stock 
appreciation right, granted more than one year before the change; (2) 
exercises after termination of stock options or stock appreciation rights 
issued as part of a normal compensation package granted more than 
one year before the change; (3) compensation previously earned and 
deferred pursuant to a plan of the employer, such as a staggered bonus 
plan, or at the election of the employee; and (4) amounts paid under a 
retirement plan that supplements a tax­qualified plan to the extent 
such amounts are designed to compensate a newly­hired key employee 
for the loss of retirement benefits attributable to services performed for 
a prior employer. 
H.R. Rep. No. 99­861, at 852­53 (1984) (Conf. Rep.); see also 1984 JCT REPORT, 
supra note 202, at 204. 
 216. See, e.g., Hankinson, supra note 203, at 770. 
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despite the payments being nondeductible, and executives 
continue to receive these payments, despite the excise tax 
imposed.”217 In fact, the enactment of these two provisions 
led to several unintended consequences that have increased 
the use of golden parachute arrangements and their cost to 
corporate shareholders. First, according to Professor 
Kennedy, “[Section 280G] was viewed as tacit approval by 
the government of these arrangements as long as the award 
provided did not exceed three times base compensation. 
Indeed, ‘hundreds of companies that had no change­in­
control agreements’ introduced these arrangements soon 
after section 280G was enacted.”218 
Second, some companies reduced or eliminated the cost 
of the excise tax imposed on corporate executives pursuant 
to Section 4999 through the use of gross­up payments to 
executives.219 The economic effect of a gross­up provision is   
 217. Id. In addition, Professors Cherry and Wong note: 
Yet another form of compensation that has proven to be 
controversial is the so­called golden parachute, a payment to the 
executive that is typically triggered in the event of a change of control 
in the corporation. The ostensible reason to adopt golden parachutes is 
to align the interest of the management with shareholders’ interests—
otherwise, incumbent management might resist an acquisition for the 
purpose of perpetuating their own tenure. However, in the vivid words 
of one commentator, golden parachutes conjure the “image of a 
laughing executive landing softly with oodles of misappropriated 
corporate assets while his corporation goes down in flames.”  
Cherry & Wong, supra note 80, at 374 (citations omitted). 
 218. Kennedy, supra note 190, at 204 (citing Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. 
Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got Here, What are the 
Problems, and How to Fix Them 28 (ECGI Finance Working Paper Series in 
Finance No. 44/2004, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305; see 
also Conway, supra note 24, at 414­19; Richard P. Bress, Note, Golden 
Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955, 963 n.38 (1987); 
Miske, supra note 87, at 1680. 
 219. See, e.g., Conway, supra note 24, at 417 (“The enactment of [sections] 
280G and 4999 resulted in executives often requiring that the company pay the 
excise tax to the IRS on behalf of the executive if they are to be paid a golden 
parachute payment.”); Wolk, supra note 203, at 139­40.  See also Corporate 
Counsel’s Guide to Employment Contracts, which sets forth the purpose of a 
gross­up provision as follows: 
The purpose of a tax gross­up allowance is to provide an executive with 
sufficient additional benefits to pay the parachute tax on the benefits to 
which he or she is entitled without the gross­up and the parachute and 
income taxes on the gross­up benefits so that his or her net after­tax 
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to transfer the punitive effects of the Section 4999 excise tax 
from the executive receiving the golden parachute payment 
to the corporation’s shareholders.220 
Commentators generally observe that the golden 
parachute rules have done little to affect the amount of   
position is equal to the position the executive would have been in had 
there been no parachute penalty tax. 
CORP. COUNS. GD. TO EMPL. CONTRACTS § 14:45 (2007). 
 220. See Hankinson, supra note 203, at 770­71. See also Stabile, supra note 24, 
noting that: 
There is evidence that not only have many corporations foregone the 
deduction, but a number have also added a “gross up” to the 
compensation paid to executives to take account of the tax imposed by 
section 280G; that is, they increase the payment made by an amount 
equal to the taxes that the executive will be required to pay. Thus, 
instead of eliminating or minimizing golden parachutes, the effect of 
the tax imposed by section 280G is to make such payments more 
expensive to the corporations. 
Id. at 93 (citing Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Continental, Inc., CIV. A. No. 9813, 
1988 WL 46064 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988)). In Tate & Lyle, the court discussed the 
effects of the gross­up provisions of a company’s golden parachute arrangement 
as follows: 
In an effort to assure the full benefits of the golden and tin 
parachutes to its employees, Staley adopted a plan of excise tax “gross­
ups”, which could cost Staley, at least, $13.8 million. These gross­ups 
require Staley to compensate each beneficiary of a parachute for the 
20% federal excise tax mandated by 26 U.S.C. §§ 280G, 4999. In effect, 
the gross­ups insure that each beneficiary receives the full amount of 
the parachute without any offset due to the excise tax. 
Tate & Lyle PLC, 1988 WL 46064, at *3. See also Corporate Counsel’s Guide to 
Employment Contracts, which notes that “the sole beneficiary of the tax gross­
up is the U.S. Treasury,” and concludes that: 
The cost of either type of tax gross­up allowance is very substantial 
to the corporation in relation to the benefits provided to the executive. 
Based on a 31 percent income tax rate, it costs a corporation, after 
taxes (using a 34 percent corporate tax rate), approximately 75 percent 
of an individual’s average annual compensation to provide the 
individual with pretax benefits equal to 299 percent, and post­tax 
benefits equal to 207 percent, of the individual’s average annual 
compensation to provide an individual with pretax benefits equal to 
415 percent and post­tax benefits equal to 224 percent of the 
individual’s average annual compensation. Therefore, the corporate 
after­tax cost doubles in order to provide the individual, after tax, with 
an additional 17 percent of average annual compensation. 
CORP. COUNS. GD. TO EMPL. CONTRACTS, supra note 219, § 14:45. 
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compensation payable upon a change of control. Rather, the 
rules are often thought of as providing a road map as to how 
to structure compensation arrangements. The government 
best summarized the effects of Sections 280G and 4999 
when it stated “[i]t is not uncommon for employment 
agreements to provide that, in the event the employee is 
subject to the excise tax, the tax will be paid by the 
company, with a gross up to reflect the income tax payable 
as a result of the employer’s payment of the tax.”221 
  
 221. Written Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation on 
Executive Compensation and Company­Owned Life Insurance Arrangements of 
Enron Corporation and Related Entities Before the S. Comm. of Fin., 110th 
Cong. 31 n.44 (2003) (statement of Mary M. Schmitt, Acting Chief of Staff of the 
Joint Comm. on Taxation). For a discussion on how shareholders bear the 
burden of these anti­golden parachute provisions, see Conway, supra note 24, 
concluding that: 
In summary, because parachute payments are often still part of 
executive compensation contracts, whatever the reasons, corporations 
are now losing deductions for any excess compensation paid plus the 
extra twenty percent excise taxes often paid on behalf the executives. 
As such, the anti­golden parachute provisions do not make the 
corporate compensation structure better for shareholders; rather, they 
make the whole prospect more expensive for the shareholders. While 
the executives remain in the same favorable position, the corporations 
have to forfeit the deductions, resulting in less profit for the 
shareholders. In addition, the shareholders still face the possibility 
that the corporation is too expensive to purchase. These results are 
inconsistent with the intent behind the provisions, mainly to help 
protect shareholder interests. 
Id. at 419. 
See also Hankinson, supra note 203, where the author states: 
Ironically, Congress’s concern that shareholders were receiving less 
money for their shares in mergers as a result of golden parachute 
payments has been exacerbated by §§ 280G and 4999 and tax gross­
ups. Eliminating §§ 280G and 4999 would actually decrease the cost of 
mergers and increase the money paid to the target shareholders or 
acquirer’s shareholders over time. However, if Congress intends to 
legislate corporate conduct through § 280G, then, at a minimum, § 
4999 should be repealed. Section 4999 is not effective in deterring 
executives from accepting golden parachute payments when the 
corporation pays the additional tax for the executive. When the 
corporation also grosses up for the executive’s individual income tax on 
these payments, the total cost to the corporation increases. 
Id. at 802 (footnote omitted).  
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IV. ARGUING AGAINST EXTENDING A REASONABLENESS 
STANDARD TO THE PUBLIC CORPORATION 
More than a dozen years ago, Professor Stabile observed 
that Congress’ attempts to limit executive compensation—
both through the general reasonableness limitation on 
executive compensation and specific Code provisions such as 
Sections 162(m), 280G, and 4999—were not “operating to 
affect executive compensation in a significant way.”222 In 
fact, there is evidence that Congress’ attempts to limit 
executive compensation have had the effect of increasing 
pay and imposing additional costs on the corporations and 
shareholders that Congress might be expected to protect.223 
Professor Stabile then asks “whether the Code can and 
should serve as a more aggressive constraint.”224 She offers 
two distinct potential congressional goals for limiting 
executive compensation through the Code: revenue raising 
and a social goal of regulating executive pay.225 Her 
conclusion is that “the Code has no role in policing executive 
compensation.”226 With respect to the first rationale, 
Professor Stabile notes that “[w]hile raising revenue is a 
legitimate use of the Code, raising tax revenues does not 
appear to be Congress’ goal in enacting the provisions that 
currently limit the executive compensation deduction.”227 
With respect to government’s goal of regulating executive 
pay, Stabile argues that such decision should remain with 
the corporation rather than the government—provided that 
the shareholders “are aware of what executives are being 
paid and have the ability to express displeasure if they do 
not like the decisions being made by the board . . . .”228 
  
 222. Stabile, supra note 24, at 94. 
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 185­200, 216­21. 
 224. Stabile, supra note 24, at 94. 
 225. Id. at 94­100. 
 226. Id. at 101. 
 227. Id.; see also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., ESTIMATED 
BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 2641, at 1 (Comm. Print 
1993) (estimating that Section 162(m) would increase revenue by only $42 
million in 1994, and by $335 million over a five year period); 1984 JCT REPORT, 
supra note 202, at 207 (estimating that Sections 280G and 4999 would increase 
fiscal year budget receipts by less than $5 million per year). 
 228. See Stabile, supra note 24, at 101. 
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Today, the question of the government’s role in 
regulating executive pay remains fertile ground for debate. 
While some ask “why bother,”229 many commentators 
continue to believe that the government has a role in 
policing executive pay.230 Regulating executive pay through 
additional corporate disclosure231 or the judiciary232 is 
beyond the scope of this Article. This author believes, 
however, that it would be inappropriate to continue to 
attempt to control the level of executive compensation 
through the tax code. 
Despite the numerous commentators who have 
analyzed this issue and determined that the Code has been 
ineffective in controlling the pay of executives of public 
corporations, one commentator continues to argue that 
Section 162(a)(1) should be enforced against public 
corporations in addition to private corporations.233 Aaron 
Zelinsky’s arguments echo those expressed by his father, 
Professor Edward Zelinsky, almost a generation ago234—
arguments that the elder Zelinsky has since abandoned.235 
  
 229. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 66, at 336­47. 
 230. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, Essay, The Answer to Excessive Executive 
Compensation Is Risk, Not the Market, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 403 (2007) (arguing 
for both increased director independence and greater equity ownership of both 
directors and executives in companies that they manage); Matthew Farrell, 
Note, A Role for the Judiciary in Reforming Executive Compensation: The 
Implications of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bank of America Corp., 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 169 (2010) (arguing for a more active role for the judiciary); 
Zelinsky, supra note 13 (arguing for increased scrutiny by the Service under 
Section 162(a)(1)). 
 231. But see Elson, supra note 230, at 404 (noting that corporate disclosure 
will not solve the problem of excessive executive compensation). 
 232. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 230. 
 233. See Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 644. 
 234. See Zelinsky, supra note 38. 
 235. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Eberl’s, Independent Investors, and the 
Incoherence of the Reasonable Compensation Rule, 92 TAX NOTES 555, 559 (2001) 
(“Under all of the circumstances, the best alternative is to abolish the 
reasonable compensation rule by repealing it legislatively.”). See also Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Is Martha Stewart Reasonably Compensated?, 99 TAX NOTES 919 
(2003), where Professor Zelinsky states: 
I once believed that the tax system could and would scrutinize the 
reasonability of compensation granted by publicly traded corporations 
to their managers. I believe this no more. . . .  
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Professor Zelinsky argued, in 1993, that the 
overpayment of executive compensation inflates a 
corporation’s tax deductions, which, in turn, reduces the 
corporate tax base.236 Since corporate executives have the 
ability to set their own salaries, the argument continues, 
they in effect constitute an unofficial class of shareholders, 
and the excessive compensation they receive is essentially 
equivalent to nondeductible dividends.237 By allowing the 
deduction of such dividends, the Service has allowed public 
corporations to understate their taxable income.238 
Professor Zelinsky’s argument would have been more 
convincing if he had not then stated that “[w]hether the 
Treasury loses revenue from this erosion of the corporate 
tax base is unclear and, ultimately, irrelevant.”239 It is 
puzzling that one could argue against the erosion of the 
corporate tax base if it is not known whether particular 
actions have the effect of reducing the amount of tax 
collected. If, rather, Professor Zelinsky’s argument was one 
in favor of “assuring the accuracy of the tax base” regardless 
of the amount of tax collected, the argument appears to be 
more logical.240 Although this argument targets the right 
issue, Professor Zelinsky attacks the wrong actors. It is 
  
The long­term solution is a legislative fix to the statute that 
abolishes the anomaly that is today the reasonable compensation 
doctrine. 
Id. at 923. 
 236. See Zelinsky, supra note 38, at 1123 (“Addressing that question, I 
conclude that denying deductibility to excessive managerial compensation will, 
in the aggregate, enhance the accuracy with which the code measures the 
corporate income tax base: excessive payments to corporate executives are 
disguised dividends, corporate earnings diverted from shareholders via 
managers’ control of their own terms of employment.”). 
 237. See id. 
 238. See id. (“As a matter of tax policy, disallowing deductibility to exorbitant 
levels of executive remuneration is an administrable extension of the code’s 
current rule that, to preserve the corporate tax base against disguised 
dividends, closely held corporations can only deduct reasonable levels of 
compensation.”). 
 239. Id. at 1125. 
 240. This appears to be the argument made by Professor Zelinsky. See id. 
(“Such considerations however, ought not to be controlling when the goal is 
assuring the accuracy of the tax base as a goal distinct from (and frequently 
incompatible with) maximizing the public fisc.”).  
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agreed that the Service should be concerned about the 
accuracy of the tax base in situations where shareholders 
are overinflating costs and experiencing no economic loss. 
But, where the overinflated costs are being paid to the 
managers of the corporation, there is a true cost to the 
shareholders. Even if one were to agree that executive 
compensation were not set by an arm’s length process, such 
amount would have to be categorized in one of three ways: 
(i) corporate waste,241 (ii) rents extracted by the 
management,242 or (iii) theft.243 All three of these items are 
generally deductible in computing corporate income.244 The 
removal of a tax deduction for these amounts would result 
in an overstatement of the corporate tax base, while 
allowing a deduction would preserve an accurate 
computation of such tax base. 
The failure to allow a deduction in the case of excessive 
compensation would result in corporate shareholders 
bearing the burden of these costs twice: (i) when such waste, 
managerial rent or theft is actually incurred through the 
compensatory payment; and (ii) when the Service requires 
  
  241. One argument that Section 162(a)(1) was intended to limit the scope of 
the business expense deduction is that the original revenue regulations 
promulgated under the predecessor to Section 162(a)(1) disallowed a deduction 
for a salary that constituted “waste or appropriation of assets of the 
corporation.” Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 639 (quoting Moran, supra note 97, at 
III.B.4). This reference to waste or appropriation of corporate assets was 
excluded from subsequent regulations. Moran, supra note 95, at A­12. In 
addition, this portion of the regulations has never been cited in case law. See 
Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 639. According to one commentator, “[t]his may 
suggest that any amount of compensation paid by a publicly held corporation 
should be per se reasonable.” Moran, supra note 95, at A­12. While it is unclear 
that the last statement necessary follows from the exclusion of the waste or 
appropriation language of the regulations, there is no authority that would 
prevent a corporation from deducting amounts found to have been spent 
unwisely. 
 242. Professors Bebchuk and Fried use the term “rents” to describe benefits 
received by corporate management greater than those that could have been 
obtained through an arm’s­length bargaining process. See BEBCHUCK & FRIED, 
supra note 38, at 4­5. Regardless of the manner obtained, there is no authority 
that any such rents would be nondeductible when paid by a corporation.  
 243. Treas. Reg. § 1.165­8(a)(1) (1960) (“Except as otherwise provided . . . any 
loss arising from theft is allowable as a deduction under section 165(a) for the 
taxable year in which the loss is sustained.”). 
 244. See supra notes 241­43. 
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the corporation to pay tax on profits that it never realized. 
Professor Zelinsky’s argument that corporate management 
is an unofficial class of shareholders, and that payments to 
such class should be treated in the same manner as 
dividends, misses the point.245 The unofficial stock 
ownership of which Professor Zelinsky complains is very 
different than the actual stock ownership of those who have 
invested in the corporation and, regardless of the 
meritorious nature of the compensation received, one should 
not punish the stockholders for the actions of this separate 
class. 
Aaron Zelinsky provides little guidance as to his motive 
for expanding the scope of Section 162(a)(1), stating only 
that Section 162(a)(1) “is best understood as an attempt to 
preserve the corporate tax base from erosion . . . .”246 
However, no authority is cited for how much erosion is 
caused to the corporate tax base by allowing a deduction for 
all compensation paid by public corporations.247 If Zelinsky 
is taking the approach of his father—that the accuracy of 
the tax base is the more important goal248—such position 
suffers from the same weaknesses as his father’s arguments 
in that it ignores the reality of the corporate structure, and 
penalizes the actual shareholders of the corporation in an 
attempt to preserve the accuracy of the tax base even where 
no showing of inaccuracy exists. 
However, the largest problem with Zelinsky’s argument 
in favor of expanding the scope of Section 162(a)(1) is that it 
would usurp the power of corporate boards of directors in 
setting compensation with an amorphous standard of 
reasonableness. Unlike Section 162(m), which provides a 
bright­line standard of $1 million of executive pay, or 
Sections 280G and 4999, which take effect only after 
parachute payments in excess of three times an executive’s 
compensation are made, Section 162(a)(1) provides a 
  
 245. See supra text accompanying note 237. 
 246. Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 641. 
 247. As stated previously, Professor Edward Zelinsky noted that “whether the 
Treasury loses revenue from this erosion of the corporate tax base is unclear  
. . . .” Zelinsky, supra note 38, at 1125; see also supra text accompanying note 
239. 
 248. See Zelinsky, supra note 38, at 1125; see also supra note 240 and 
accompanying text. 
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corporate board no guidance as to the level of deductible 
pay.249 Corporations and the Service would be looking in the 
rearview mirror—fighting over compensation paid years 
earlier—to determine whether an amount paid would be 
considered reasonable.250 
Even Zelinsky’s father, who once supported an 
expansion of Section 162(a)(1) to public corporations prior to 
abandoning such position, did not believe that such a vague 
standard was workable.251 In fact, Professor Zelinsky argued 
for the passage of the bright­line, objective test of 
reasonableness found in Section 162(m) to analyze the 
deductibility of corporate compensation.252 
This usurpation of power would occur even without any 
clear guidance as to how reasonableness would be 
determined. Aaron Zelinsky provides two possible 
alternatives.253 First, the Service could examine the 
compensation paid by publicly held corporations in an 
identical fashion to the manner that Section 162(a)(1) is   
 249. See supra Part III.A­B. 
 250. See Sikon, supra note 148, at 326. Sikon notes: 
[T]he large corporation is on notice through the provisions of Internal 
Revenue Code sections 280G and 162(m) as to how to determine the 
potentially non­deductible amounts. Except for the reduction to excess 
parachute payments for reasonable compensation, these provisions do 
not require a highly subjective judgment of value by the government. 
They are straight­forward mathematical calculations. 
Id. 
 251. See Zelinsky, supra note 38, at 1125. 
 252. See id. at 1125­26. For a discussion of the objective test, see Sikon, supra 
note 148, which states:  
It is only for public policy reasons that these statutory provisions arose, 
seemingly to curb abuses in corporate activity that were perceived by 
the legislature to have a detrimental effect on the shareholders of the 
companies, as well as on the general public. In the spirit of section 
162(a), these provisions provide bright line calculations of 
presumptively unreasonable compensation and render it non­
deductible. 
Id. at 325­26 (footnotes omitted). 
 253. See Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 645­46. Regardless of the interference of 
the Service in corporate governance, Zelinsky concludes that “given the reality 
of managerial power and the resulting degradation of the corporate tax base 
through unreasonable compensation payments to the executives of publicly held 
businesses, one of these solutions is appropriate.” Id. at 646. 
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applied to privately held corporations.254 While Zelinsky 
argues that this alternative would provide “clear guidance 
to public boards,”255 he also notes: 
However, such an analysis might not address the systemic 
problems which result from managerial power over board 
decisions in the public corporate context. If unreasonable 
compensation and board capture are widespread phenomena, the 
use of comparables could actually hurt, rather than help, preserve 
the corporate tax base, as salaries could be increased in tandem 
by opportunistic executives.256 
This first approach, then, adds nothing to the 
conversation regarding the reasonableness of executive pay. 
As Zelinsky admits, if unreasonable compensation is a 
widespread problem, use of comparables to determine the 
reasonableness of a particular corporation’s pay structure 
would be ineffective and lead to excessive compensation 
becoming the norm.257 If unreasonable compensation is not a 
widespread problem, then Zelinsky’s concern about applying 
a reasonableness standard to public company pay becomes a 
moot issue. 
Zelinsky’s second proposed approach, which takes into 
account the managerial power theory of executive 
compensation, would require the Service to first analyze 
whether there was an arm’s­length relationship between a 
corporation’s management and its board of directors when 
the compensation was determined.258 According to Zelinsky, 
“[g]reater board independence would indicate a stronger 
presumption that compensation is reasonable.”259 
While this approach provides an opportunity to 
ruminate about the methodology for determining the nature 
  
 254. See id. at 645. 
 255. Id. at 645. 
 256. Id. at 646. 
 257. See id. 
 258. See id. 
 259. Id. Zelinsky notes that this approach would “have the potentially 
negative impact of inserting the Service into corporate governance.” Id. 
Regardless, however, Zelinsky concludes that “given the reality of managerial 
power and the resulting degradation of the corporate tax base through 
unreasonable compensation payments to the executives of publicly held 
businesses, one of these solutions is appropriate.” Id. 
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of the corporate director­management relationship, such a 
generalized standard provides no roadmap for fixing the 
problems with executive pay.260 How would the Service 
determine whether there was an arm’s­length relationship 
between the corporation’s management and its board of 
directors? What factors would the Service use to determine 
whether managerial power affected the board’s decision to 
set executive pay? Until objective standards can be defined, 
it is unclear that anything would be accomplished other 
than confusion. 
The difficulty in determining reasonableness in the 
public company context, and this author’s concern with 
Zelinsky’s suggestions, arose with the beginning words of 
his article. Zelinsky notes that in March 2009, AIG 
provoked a firestorm by releasing information about 
bonuses to be paid that were “derided as most outrageous 
and unreasonable.”261 Zelinsky expresses agreement with 
these statements when he states that “taxpayer 
subsidization of unreasonable compensation is hardly 
limited to AIG.”262 Nowhere in his article, however, does 
Zelinsky cite any proof that such compensation is truly 
unreasonable (rather than large in absolute amount), that 
such compensation was not determined through an arm’s­
length process of negotiation, or that AIG’s board of 
directors suffers from the problems of managerial power 
which troubled Professors Bebchuk and Fried.263 An 
expansion of the reasonableness test of Section 162(a)(1) 
  
 260. The opportunity to ruminate about the relationship between corporate 
directors and corporate managers is not new. Zelinsky distinguishes his article 
from his father’s, noting that he has “incorporate[d] recent developments in the 
managerial power hypothesis into interpretations of § 162(a)(1), and by 
proposing a modification of the IRS and the Court’s decisionmaking processes to 
incorporate the managerial power hypothesis.” Id. at 640 n.13. However, in 
1993, Professor Zelinsky’s rationale for applying Section 162(a)(1) to public 
corporations rested, in part, on “[t]he contemporary critique of executive pay 
practices [which] holds that, in the case of publicly held businesses, essentially 
undisciplined executives also set their own remuneration at excess levels.” 
Zelinsky, supra note 38, at 1124; see also supra text accompanying notes 49­51. 
 261. Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 637 (citing Edmund L. Andrews & Peter 
Baker, Bonus Money at Troubled A.I.G. Draws Heavy Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/business/16aig.html) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 262. Id. 
 263. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 38, at 4­6. 
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would provide the government with the subjective power to 
scrutinize corporate actions on compensation any time that 
the public, the press or the Congress “feels” that executive 
pay is too much. 
Zelinsky argues that there will be three side effects to 
his proposal.264 First, limiting deductions for the portion of 
executive compensation deemed excessive would stop 
“taxpayer subsidies of economically inefficient behavior.”265 
Second, applying a reasonableness standard “to publicly 
traded corporations would harmonize the tax treatment of 
public and private corporations with respect to excessive 
executive compensation.”266 Finally, the Service’s litigation 
and success in the courts on this issue would potentially 
“reduce excessive compensation through shaming and 
potential derivative suits.”267 
Zelinsky, however, presents no evidence that any of 
these benefits would result. Except for a potential 
harmonization between publicly traded and privately held 
corporations, experience suggests that corporations would 
continue to pay compensation at the desired levels—
  
 264. See Zelinsky, supra note 13, at 644. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 645. 
 267. Id. Zelinsky further states: 
Corporations, and the individuals who sit on their boards, may seek to 
avoid the negative publicity associated with government suits alleging 
excessive compensation for income tax purposes. If so, they will be less 
likely to pay excessive salaries. . . . Moreover, the threat of future 
derivative action will provide a further check on excessive 
compensation. Once the IRS and the courts have made a determination 
that particular compensation is excessive under § 162, shareholders 
could potentially use that determination to substantiate derivative 
suits for recovery against the board for corporate waste. 
This Comment does not advocate IRS oversight as the lead 
mechanism for purifying the muddled world of executive 
compensation: addressing the issues raised by the managerial power 
hypothesis will likely require coordinated action by a variety of 
governmental and nongovernmental actors. Nevertheless, if the IRS 
focuses on ensuring that the corporate tax base is protected against 
deduction of unreasonable compensation paid by publicly traded 
corporations, shareholders and shareholder activists are likely to be 
emboldened by the IRS’s enforcement activities. 
Id.  
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foregoing a tax deduction where the Service successfully 
challenged its pay levels.268 Rather than having the effect of 
reducing executive compensation, the more likely result of 
the Service’s challenge to executive compensation would be 
inurement to the benefit of the Treasury at the expense of a 
corporation’s shareholders. In addition, there is no 
indication that public shaming or concern regarding 
derivative lawsuits would have any effect on the largess of 
executive pay. One need only look to Sections 162(m) and 
280G, which serve as proxies for determining whether 
executive compensation is reasonable. There is no evidence 
that either of these provisions have caused corporate boards 
to reduce the size of executive pay packages. Instead, as 
previously discussed, corporations continue to increase the 
amount paid to executives in spite of the fact that these 
Code provisions place upon such pay the stamp of 
unreasonableness. 
In another recently published piece, a remarkably 
insightful comment regarding the ability of the government 
to use the tax code to affect executive compensation was 
made: 
In the end, the ingenuity of accountants and lawyers will always 
be able to find creative solutions to congressional attempts to limit 
executive compensation, particularly via the tax code. In contrast 
to legal scholarship, research from the business and economics 
academy indicates that executive pay is the result of a competitive 
market. Taken at face value, this research strongly suggests that 
manipulations of the tax code, effectively government caps on pay, 
will cause market distortions. If the law attempts to dictate 
compensation at a level below market compensation, the 
overwhelming power of the market will find a way around this 
problem.269 
Such has been the result with Section 162(m) and 
Sections 280G and 4999.  One can only hope that Congress 
will heed these words before enacting future tax legislation 
regarding executive compensation. 
  
 268. See supra Part III.A­B. See also supra note 66, where Professor Yablon 
notes that the “economic inefficiency” that concerns Zelinsky may be simply the 
cost of doing business through widely­held public corporations. 
 269. Salley, supra note 189, at 763 (footnote omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
Section 162(a)(1) provides a deduction for a reasonable 
allowance for compensation for services actually rendered. 
The literal language of the statute, combined with past 
practice and an analysis of the legislative history, makes it 
clear that such provision was meant to expand the business 
expense deduction of Section 162(a) rather than to limit 
such deduction. 
The problem of excessive executive compensation may 
be real or, as much of the research has shown, no problem 
may exist. Regardless of which side of this controversy one 
believes, one thing is clear: Congress’ attempts to legislate 
executive compensation through the Code have had the 
unintended consequences of contributing to an increase in 
executive pay. While Congress may again in the future 
attempt to deal with the public outrage surrounding this 
issue, one can only hope that it has learned from its 
experience that our tax laws are not the proper mechanism 
for regulating executive pay. 
 
 
